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I. INTRODUCTION 
Increasingly some European Union (“EU”) Member States are 
undertaking practices to revoke or refuse nationality and thus EU 
citizenship, yet some of these practices are unlawful. It does not seem 
correct that a Member State’s unlawful act would have the result of 
denying an individual EU citizenship, but in principle EU Member 
States are the gatekeepers to EU citizenship.  This Article will question 
the impact of measures denying nationality on EU citizenship, and 
conclude that, when an EU Member State unlawfully denies 
nationality, the person can nonetheless still acquire EU citizenship. 
Whether a person acquires the nationality of the state largely falls 
within the discretion of the state, and international law plays little role. 
This practice is true for both acquisition and withdrawal of nationality, 
although those two processes have slightly different rules. In general, 
the revocation of nationality is not prohibited by international law;1 
however, that general rule is increasingly subjected to several 
exceptions. 
This general rule is also applicable within the European Union. 
The nationals of EU Member States acquire EU citizenship as an 
automatic legal consequence of their nationality and their state’s 
membership in the European Union. In line with the general rule, EU 
Member States are free to set their nationality law within their own 
discretion. This practice includes laws that significantly restrict the 
acquisition of nationality and laws that aggressively revoke nationality. 
For example, several Member States have exercised this discretion to 
refuse nationality to Roma/Romani people,2 or to certain Latvia 
“noncitizens,”3 or revoke nationality from individuals who have joined 
 
1. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 394 (6th ed. 2003) 
(“Existing practice and jurisprudence does not support a general rule that deprivation of 
nationality is illegal”). 
2.  See Adam M. Warnke, Vagabonds, Tinkers, and Travelers: Statelessness Among the 
East European Roma, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL L. STUD. 335, 361 (1999). 
3. See Dimitry Kochenov & Aleksejs Dimitrovs, EU Citizenship for Latvian 
“Noncitizens”: A Concrete Proposal, 38 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 55, 55-56 (2016). 
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the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”).4 The practice of acquiring 
EU citizenship, being linked to the acquisition of Member State 
nationality, has largely tolerated these consequential limitations on 
acquiring EU citizenship. 
However, international and European law continues to develop 
and increasingly constrains state freedom in adopting domestic 
nationality law. Regarding the revocation of Member State nationality, 
EU law demands that the state consider the possibly disproportionate 
consequential loss of EU citizenship. European human rights law limits 
revocation for the impact that act has on other human rights, such as 
freedom from discrimination and the right to one’s identity. 
International law also restricts revocation of nationality when it results 
in statelessness or constitutes an arbitrary or discriminatory act. 
Regarding the refusal of Member State nationality acquisition, the 
same sources also constrain state freedom. EU law and European 
human rights law demand that such a refusal should not otherwise 
infringe other human rights, and international law obliges states to 
protect every person’s right to a nationality. In many ways, both 
international and European law now make some revocations or refusals 
of nationality unlawful. 
If a denial of Member State nationality is indeed unlawful, then 
the next question is whether such an unlawful act can have 
consequences for EU citizenship. Under both international law and 
European law, there are several remedies for an unlawful act. For 
example, EU Member States must act in line with the duty of sincere 
cooperation. Under international law, unlawful acts cannot create legal 
rights. This article will argue that, when the denial of Member State 
nationality is unlawful, other Member States and the Union itself may 
nonetheless recognize EU citizenship. 
 
4. See Megan Specia, ISIS Cases Raise a Question: What Does It Mean to Be Stateless?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/isis-
shamima-begum-citizenship-stateless.html [https://perma.cc/2V6D-GGRP] (reporting on the 
denationalization of Shamima Begum by the United Kingdom); Joseph Nasr, Susan Fenton, & 
Ed Osmond, Germany to Strip IS Fighters of Citizenship, REUTERS (March 3, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-justice-idUSKCN1QK0OH 
[https://perma.cc/5Q7N-VG5S]. See Shamima Begum v Sec’y St. Home Dep’t, Appl. No. 
SC/163/2019, Open Judgment (Spec. Immigr. Appls. Comm’n, UK, Feb. 7, 2020).  
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II. ACQUISITION OF EU CITIZENSHIP 
EU citizenship was created by the Treaty on European Union.5 It 
is additional to and does not replace nationality.6 It provides a number 
of rights for the individual directly from EU law, but more than merely 
a description of various rights under European law,7 EU citizenship has 
come to be understood as the fundamental status of a person when 
exercising rights under European law.8 The acquisition of EU 
 
5. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 9, Oct. 26, 2012, O.J. 
(C 326/13) (“Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of 
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship”) [hereinafter TEU]; 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 20(1), Oct. 
26, 2012, O.J. (C 326/47) [hereinafter TFEU], previously Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union & Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 17, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 
325/01) (“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality 
of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional 
to and not replace national citizenship”) [hereinafter TEC]; Directive 2004/38/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union 
and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, 
O.J. (L 158/78). 
6. See TEU, supra note 5, art. 9. 
7. See Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office national de l’emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-6221. 
8. See Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 Apr. 
2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, O.J. (L 158/78) 3, supra note 5; Case C-221/17, 
Tjebbes et al. v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 2019 E.C.R. 4 (Mar. 12) [hereinafter Tjebbes 
Case]; Case C-82/16, K.A. & Others, 2018 E.C.R. 47; Case C-165/14, Marín v. Admin del 
Estado, 2016 E.C.R. 107; Case C-304/14, Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. CS, 2016 E.C.R. 
3; Case C-359/13, Martens v. Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2015 E.C.R. 3; 
Case C-523/11, 585/11, Prinz v. Region Hannover & Seeberger v. Studentenwerk Heidelberg, 
2013 E.C.R. 3; Case C-256/11, Dereci et al v. Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2011 E.C.R. 62; 
Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, 2010 E.C.R. 43; Case C-50/06, Comm’n Eur. Cmtys. v. 
Netherlands, 2007 E.C.R. 32; Case C-192/05, Tas-Hagen & Tas v. Raadskamer WUBO van de 
Pensioen- en Uitkeringsraad, 2006 E.C.R. 18; Case C-145/04, Spain v. U.K., 2006 E.C.R. 74; 
Case C-209/03, Bidar v. Ealing, Sec’y State Educ. and Skills, 2005 E.C.R. 31; Case C-147/03, 
Comm’n Eur. Cmtys. v. Austria, 2005 E.C.R. 45; Case C-403/03, Schempp v. Finanzamt 
München v, 2005 E.C.R. 15; Case C-224/02, Pusa v. Osuuspankkien Keskinäinen 
Vakuutusyhtiö, 2004 E.C.R. 16; Case C-200/02, Zhu & Chen v. Sec’y State Home Dep’t, 2004 
E.C.R. 25; Case C-482/01, 493/01, Orfanopoulos v. Baden-Württemberg v. Oliveri, 2004 E.C.R. 
65; Case C-148/02, Avello v. Belgium, 2003 E.C.R. 22; Case C-413/99, Baumbast & R v. Sec’y 
State Home Dep’t, 2002 E.C.R. 82; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office national de l’emploi, 2002 
E.C.R. 28; Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve, 2001 E.C.R. 31; Case C-274/96, Criminal proceeding against Bickel & Franz, 1998 
E.C.R. I-7660; Case C-85/96, Martínez Sala v. Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. 59; Case C-53/81, Levin v. 
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 1982 E.C.R. 1039. 
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citizenship, is more than simply rights, it is also creating a status of a 
direct legal bond between the individual and the Union.9 
Notwithstanding its nature as a fundamental, independent status,10 
it does have some degree of dependency on the nationality of an EU 
Member State.11 This dependency, however, is limited to the 
acquisition of EU citizenship status.12 An individual acquires EU 
citizenship when he or she is “holding” the nationality of an EU 
Member State.13 EU law does not expressly state whether loss of EU 
citizenship status is also dependent on loss of member state 
nationality.14 By implication, it could be understood that loss is also 
dependent, though this has never been expressly confirmed. 
Because the acquisition of EU citizenship is dependent on the 
acquisition of member state nationality, Member States can exercise a 
certain amount of discretion over whether an individual acquires it.15 
Not only do Member States have a considerable degree of flexibility in 
prescribing their nationality laws,16 but Member States can also 
determine which individuals are considered its nationals for purposes 
of EU citizenship.17 This latter concern is primarily an issue of persons 
 
9. See William Thomas Worster, Brexit and the International Law Prohibitions on the 
Loss of EU Citizenship, 15 INT’L ORG. L. REV. 341, 341 (2018). 
10. See Dimitry Kochenov, Ius Tractum of Many Faces: European Citizenship and the 
Difficult Relationship Between Status and Rights, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 181 n.81 (2009). 
11. See Case C-165/14, Marín v. Admin del Estado, supra note 8, at 6; Case C-304/14, 
Sec’y State Home Dep’t v. CS, supra note 8, at 3; Case C-135/08, Rottmann v. Bayern, supra 
note 8, at 3; Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 352. 
12. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 354. 
13. See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 20 (“Every person holding the nationality of a member 
States shall be a citizen of the Union”). 
14. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 354. 
15. See Council Decision, concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty 
of European Union, Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, annex 1, 1992 O.J. (C 348/01) 
1; Case C-369/90, Micheletti & Ors v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-
4258, I-4262; Report from the Commission on the Citizenship of the Union, COM (1993) 702 
final (Dec. 21, 1993) 2 (“wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community reference 
is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual possesses the 
nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national law of the 
Member State concerned.”) [hereinafter Micheletti Case]; Third Report from the Commission 
on Citizenship of the Union, COM (2001) 506 final (Sept. 7 2001) 7 (“It is therefore worth 
pointing out that: – it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions for acquiring and 
losing the nationality of that state”). 
16.  See Rottmann v Bayern, supra note 8; Case C-192/99, The Queen v Sec’y St. Home 
Dep’t ex parte Kaur, 2001 E.C.R. I-1252, I-1259 [hereinafter Kaur Case]. 
17. Final Act to Treaty on European Union, Declaration on Nationality of a Member State, 
July 29, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 98. However, it is not entirely clear how much discretion Member 
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connected to overseas territories who might have a slightly different 
legal relationship to the metropolitan state within the state’s 
constitutional order.18 For example, Denmark has excluded the Faroe 
Islands from the European Union, even though the islands are part of 
the Kingdom of Denmark, and thus Faroe Islanders do not acquire EU 
citizenship.19 Similarly, the United Kingdom has identified certain 
forms and categories of nationality under domestic law that do not 
qualify for EU citizenship, even though the individual has some sort of 
legal bond with that state.20 
III. LAWFULNESS OF REFUSING OR REVOKING NATIONALITY 
The next section will discuss situations where revocation or 
refusal to grant nationality is unlawful. International law largely leaves 
states to implement their nationality laws in their own discretion and 
does not interfere. For example, the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain 
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides that 
“[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its 
nationals” and that “[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the 
nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with 
 
States have in this regard, see e.g. Akos G. Toth, The Legal Status of the Declarations Attached 
to the Single European Act, 23 COMMON MKT L. REV. 803, 807-12 (1986), although practice 
suggests it is quite expansive. 
18.  See TFEU, supra note 5, at art. 355(5); see also Treaty amending, with regard to 
Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities art. 3, Feb. 1, 1985, O.J. (L 29); 
TEC, supra note 5, at arts. 182, 299(2)-(3), annex II; Reg 1612/68/EEC, of the Council of 15 
Oct. 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 2; 
Case C-300/04, Eman & Sevinger v. Coll. van Burgemeester en Wethouders van Den Haag,  
2006 E.C.R. I-8060, I-8087. 
19. See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 355(5)(a). 
20. See TFEU, supra note 5, art. 355(5)(c); Note to the Government of the Italian Republic 
Concerning a Declaration Replacing the Declaration on the Definition of the Term ‘National’ 
Made at the Time of Signature of the Treaty of Accession of 22 Jan. 1972, 31 Dec. 1982, UKTS 
67 (1983). The United Kingdom excluded certain EU citizenship rights from UK nationals in 
Jersey, Guernsey, and Man who are EU citizens, but do not have the right to free movement. 
This was only possible because the exclusion was included in the EU treaties and those persons 
never acquired the rights in the first place. It would be quite a different matter for the United 
Kingdom to attempt to revoke those rights. See also Treaty of Accession to the European 
Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, 1st U.K. Declaration, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. L 73/ 196; K.R. Simmonds, 
The British Nationality Act 1981 and the Definition of the Term “National” for Community 
Purposes, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 675, 676-78 (1984). 
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the law of the State.”21 However, prior to the 1930 Hague Convention, 
the Permanent Court of International Justice had already opined that it 
was certainly possible for international law to govern the rules of 
nationality, and such limitations might arise in the future.22 Thus by 
1955, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) concluded that, where 
there was no genuine connection between an individual and the state, 
other states were not required to recognize the grant of nationality,23 
already providing one exception to the more absolute rule stated in the 
Hague Convention. Later, the International Law Commission 
concluded that limitations imposed by international law were well 
established.24 What had not so clearly appeared in international law at 
this point was any obligation to grant nationality. That would come 
later. This section will consider the most recent developments in 
international law governing nationality, under both general 
international law and EU law, and apply to cases of revocation or 
refusal to grant nationality, in order to identify situations that may be 
unlawful. 
A. Revocation of nationality 
The first scenario of possible unlawful refusal of nationality 
contemplated in this article is the revocation of nationality. 
Historically, many states have claimed a right to revoke nationality and 
send former nationals into exile.25 As recently as 10 years ago, this 
 
21. See, e.g., Hague Convention Governing Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of 
Nationalities arts. 1-2, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89. 
22. See Permanent Court of Int’l Just. (ser. B) Advisory Opinion No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7, 
1923). 
23. See Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1955 I.C.J. 4, at 23 (Apr. 6). 
24. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/61/10, at 33-34 (2006) (states must comply with international law when granting their 
nationality); Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Fifty-First 
Session, (1999) (Vol. II)(2) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 24, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 
(same); Documents of the Forty-Ninth Session, (1997) (Vol. II)(1) Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 20, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1997/Add.1 (same, specifically regarding human rights law). 
25. See Alien Act of 1793, 33 Geo. 3, c. 4 (UK) (does not distinguish between aliens and 
nationals); Penal Servitude Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 2 (UK) (abolishing transportation); 
CHARLES DELESSERT, L’ETABLISSEMENT ET LE SEJOUR DES ETRANGERS AU POINT DE VU 
JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE 52 (1924); H. LESSING, DAS RECHT DER STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT 
UND DUE ABERKENNUNG DER STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT ZU STRAF-UND SICHERUNGSZWECKEN 
113 (1937); Ernest Lehr, La Nationalité, in ERNEST LEHR, LES PRINCIPAUX ETATS DU GLOBE 
16 (1909); Gerald R. Miller, Banishment–A Medieval Tactic in Modern Criminal Law, 5 UTAH 
L. REV. 365, 365-66 (1957). 
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practice had all but ended,26 partly reflecting a revulsion against 
practices resembling the Nazi Nuremberg Laws.27 With the rise in 
global terrorism, a number of countries have reasserted the right to 
denationalize nationals who commit or provide aid to terrorist 
organizations, or are considering adopting provisions to revoke 
nationality.28 Within the European Union, Belgium,29 Denmark,30 
 
26. See Chama L.C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Econ. & Soc. Council, (Special Rapporteur), 
Analysis of the Current Trends and Developments Regarding the Right to Leave Any Country 
Including One’s Own, and to Return to One’s Own Country, and Some Other Rights or 
Considerations Arising Therefrom, U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1988/35, paras. 48, 116, 119 
(June 20, 1988). 
27. See Gefek Uber Den Miberrui Von Ginburderungen Und Die Ubbertunnung Der 
Deitinchen Graatsangehorigeit [Law Concerning Cancellation of Naturalizations and 
Deprivation of Nationality], July 14, 1933, RGBL. I at 480 (Ger.) (revoking naturalizations, 
primarily targeting Jews, between Nov. 9, 1918, and Jan. 30, 1933); JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, 
MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INT’L L. &  PRAC. 88-89 (1995); Megan Specia, ISIS Cases Raise 
a Question: What Does It Mean to Be Stateless?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/isis-shamima-begum-citizenship-
stateless.html [https://perma.cc/JB23-73GH]. 
28. See, e.g., Australia: R. Thwaites, New Laws Make Loss of Citizenship a Counter-
Terrorism Tool, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 11, 2015), http://theconversation.com/new-laws-
make-loss-of-citizenship-a-counter-terrorism-tool-51725 [https://perma.cc/7XF7-NY9W]; Fact 
Check: How Does Australia’s Plan to Strip Foreign Rights of Citizenship Compare to Other 
Nations?, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-06-
11/foreignfighters-citizenship-around-the-world/6498920 [https://perma.cc/B6NJ-9Q66]; An 
Act to Amend the Citizenship Act and to Make Consequential Amendments to Other Acts, c. 22 
(Bill C-24) (Can.); Daiva Stasiulis, The Extraordinary Statelessness of Deepan Budlakoti: The 
Erosion of Canadian Citizenship Through Citizenship Deprivation, 11 STUD. IN SOC. JUST. 1, 
8 (2017); Simon Tomlinson, Norway Considers Revoking Citizenship of People Who Take Part 
in Terror Activities or Wars Abroad – Echoing the Call of Boris Johnson, DAILY MAIL (Aug. 
27, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2735498/Norway-considers-revoking-
citizenship-people-terror-activities-wars-abroad-echoing-call-Boris-Johnson.html 
[https://perma.cc/2SGP-5LFG]. 
29.  See CODE PÉNAL [C.Pén.] [BELGIAN CRIMINAL CODE], art. 23/2 (Belg.); Grounds for 
Concern: Belgium’s Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:32 AM), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/11/03/grounds-
concern/belgiums-counterterror-responses-paris-and-brussels-attacks#page 
[https://perma.cc/2N42-AV3W]. 
30. See STRAFFELOVEN [DANISH CRIM. CODE], § 114 (Den.). 
2020] EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP 775 
France,31 the Netherlands,32 and the United Kingdom,33 have adopted 
provisions to revoke nationality when a national commits a terrorism 
offense. Other EU states, such as Germany and Sweden, have also 
considered similar measures.34 This section will first examine whether 
such practices would violate EU law, and secondly, whether they 
would violate international law. 
1. European regional law 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) has ruled 
directly on point that revocation of nationality by a member state of the 
European Union may implicate EU law. In the Rottmann case, the 
Court found that when a member state withdraws its nationality from 
an individual, it must take into consideration the impact on EU 
citizenship,35 and, in the Tjebbes case, the Court held that this 
consideration must be an individualized assessment, not an automatic 
operation of law.36 While the CJEU fundamentally respected the power 
of the member state to withdraw nationality, it suggested that a Member 
 
31. See Kim Willsher, Hollande Drops Plan to Revoke Citizenship of Dual-National 
Terrorists, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/30/francois-hollande-drops-plan-to-revoke-
citizenship-of-dual-national-terrorists [https://perma.cc/D75W-TNNY] (considering, and 
rejecting, even more expansive denationalization measures for dual nationals from birth); Maïa 
de la Baume, Court Upholds France’s Move to Strip Citizenship of Man Jailed on Terror 
Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/24/world/europe/amedy-coulibaly-paris-attacks-burial.html 
[https://perma.cc/2VLU-UFTN] (only applying to naturalized nationals). 
32. See Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap [Netherlands Nationality Act], art. 14(2) 
(Neth.); see also Tjebbes Case, supra note 8. 
33. See Victoria Parsons, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, Theresa May 
deprived 33 Individuals of British Citizenship in 2015 (June 21, 2016), 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2016-06-21/citizenship-stripping-new-figures-
reveal-theresa-may-has-deprived-33-individuals-of-british-citizenship 
[https://perma.cc/M7VL-P9AR]. 
34.  See, e.g., Germany Plans to Strip Passports of Fighters with 2nd Nationality, AL 
JAZEERA (Mar 4, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/germany-plans-strip-
passports-fighters-2nd-nationality-190304182914343.html [https://perma.cc/J5ST-268K]; 
Justin Huggler, Dual Nationals Who Fight for Terror Groups to be Stripped of German 
Citizenship, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 11, 2016); Arthur Lyons, Swedish Prime Minister Refuses to 
Strip Citizenship: “ISIS Fighters Can Return,” VOICE EUR. (Mar. 5, 2019),  
https://voiceofeurope.com/2019/03/swedish-prime-minister-refuses-to-strip-citizenship-isis-
fighters-can-return/ [https://perma.cc/T3CP-N953]. 
35. See Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8. 
36. See Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, paras. 9-10. 
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State was not entirely free to act as it wished in regards to domestic 
nationality law.37 
What remains still unclear from Rottmann and Tjebbes is whether 
the Court would ever find a withdrawal of nationality so significant for 
EU citizenship that it would find the withdrawal unlawful. We might 
consider, for example, a case of withdrawal of nationality as the direct 
result of the exercise of EU citizenship rights, such as a withdrawal of 
nationality due to extended time resident abroad relying on the right to 
free movement.38 It is difficult to see how such a revocation would be 
lawful under EU law, though it does stretch Rottmann and Tjebbes 
quite far. Surely the CJEU would not permit a state to revoke an 
individual’s nationality when he or she simply exercised their rights 
under EU law.  Another more difficult scenario might be revocation of 
nationality as punishment for the distasteful exercise of free speech or 
some other fundamental right. Again, it seems wrong at first glance, 
though identifying the precise legal basis is more challenging. 
Unfortunately, the CJEU has not given us more guidance on whether 
acts would ever rise to the level that the court would adjudge the act a 
violation of EU law, and, in fact, Tjebbes suggests that this bar is quite 
high. 
One other important implication comes out of Rottmann and 
Tjebbes for EU citizenship: they reaffirm that EU citizenship is a 
separate and independent status from member state nationality. If EU 
citizenship was entirely dependent on and derivative from member 
state nationality, then EU citizenship should not be a distinct issue from 
the withdrawal of member state nationality. It should not call for a 
separate consideration under EU law. Since the CJEU concluded that 
these cases do call for a distinct consideration as to EU citizenship, then 
we must conclude that the Court conceives of EU citizenship as having 
its own distinct rights and nature.39 Of course, this judgment only 
 
37. See Dimitry Kochenov, A Real European Citizenship: A New Jurisdiction Test: A 
Novel Chapter in the Development of the Union in Europe, 18 COLUM.  J. EUR. L. 55, 77 (2011). 
38. See Case C-221/17, Tjebbes Case, supra note 8 (explicitly excluding such a scenario 
from consideration, though implying that such a scenario would raise significantly distinct 
considerations); Dimitry Kochenov, supra note 10, at 191 (citing Nicholas Sitaropoulos, 
Freedom of Movement and the Right to a Nationality v. Ethnic Minorities: The Case of ex Art. 
19 of the Greek Nationality Code, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 205, 205 (2004). 
39. See Dimitry Kochenov, supra note 37, at 76; see generally Worster, Brexit, supra note 
9 (2018) (arguing that Brexit revocation of EU citizenship without revocation of Member State 
nationality is problematic). 
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reaffirms the view on the independence of EU citizenship that was 
expressed in the earlier cases.40 
We should probably not make too big a point of emphasizing that 
EU law protects EU citizenship, because the Court of Justice in 
Rottmann and Tjebbes only emphasized that the Member State must 
take EU law into consideration. In the actual aftermath of Rottmann, 
Germany reacted to the Court’s judgment by affirming Rottmann’s loss 
of nationality, following consideration of the impact on EU 
citizenship.41 In Tjebbes, the Court ordered an individualized 
assessment, though it upheld the right of the Netherlands to revoke 
nationality due to the mere failure to renew a passport.42 And it is 
unclear what criteria any individualized consideration would need to 
include and evaluate.43 The EU legal protection of EU citizenship 
seems to be quite weak. 
In any event, it appears that EU law does have some notional 
limitation, albeit vague and persuasive, on the ability of Member States 
to withdraw their nationality with consequences for EU citizenship. 
While we do not yet know the precise parameters of those limitations 
from EU law, 44 it is certainly conceivable that an abusive, punitive, 
perhaps arbitrary, revocation of nationality, with consequences for EU 
citizenship, might run afoul of EU law. To date no Member State has 
ever attempted to withdraw member state nationality without also 
withdrawing EU citizenship. Perhaps those legal gymnastics will come 
in time,45 although if the individual still retained EU citizenship, then 
 
40. See Micheletti Case, supra note 15 (refusing to permit a Member State to apply its own 
nationality laws, following Nottebohm’s genuine link, to an individual holding nationalities of 
both a Member State and a non-Member State); Nottebohm Case, supra note 23, at 23; see also 
Zhu & Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, supra note 8; Case C-136/78, Ministère 
Public v. Vincent Auer, E.C.R. 1979 450. Cf. Case C-34/09, Zambrano v. Office national de 
l’emploi, E.C.R. 2011 I-1251 (although not discussing the interference with enjoyment of EU 
citizenship, the Court held a similar standard for interference with the enjoyment of EU 
citizenship rights). 
41. Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE] [Supreme Administrative Court], Nov. 11, 
2010, 5 C 12.10 (F.R.G.). 
42. See Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, para. 44. 
43. See id. 
44. See Andrew C. Evans, Nationality Law and the Free Movement of Persons in the EEC: 
With Special Reference to the British Nationality Act 1981, 2 Y.B. EUR. L. 173, 189 (1982) 
(arguing duty of loyalty limits discretion). 
45. Note that this idea is not entirely excluded. A provision to make it impossible to sever 
Member State nationality and EU citizenship was proposed and rejected. See Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union 1984 O.J. (C 77) art. 3 (“The citizens of the Member States 
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it will be difficult for the member state to resist giving the individual 
admission and residence. 
In addition, to EU law protecting EU citizenship, EU law also 
protects other rights that may be implicated by a withdrawal of 
nationality. The EU legal order includes the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights as a binding obligation.46 By its terms, the charter does not 
explicitly protect a right to nationality or EU citizenship. However, it 
does prohibit EU Member States from imposing measures based on 
“any discrimination,” including race, ethnicity, social origin, genetic 
features, and others.47 While it has not been adjudicated on point, there 
is no good reason to believe that this provision would not apply to 
nationality legislation. Following on the argument above, it should not 
be lawful for an EU Member State to revoke nationality as a 
consequence of the exercise of Charter rights, or revoke nationality that 
might have an unjustified impact on the enjoyment of Charter rights. 
The above paragraphs discussed EU law and while the European 
Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”) is not an EU instrument, the 
protections within the Convention are binding on their own before the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and are relevant in 
interpreting protections of EU law under the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. The Convention does not expressly protect the right to acquire 
or retain a nationality.48 The one exception to this failure to intervene 
in nationality matters is Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR which prohibits 
states from withdrawing nationality merely as a pretext to expulsion.49 
However, the revocation of nationality can be reviewed by the ECtHR 
 
shall ipso facto be citizens of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be dependent upon 
citizenship of a Member State; it may not be independently acquired or forfeited.”). 
46. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. (C 364) 1 (Dec. 18, 
2000). 
47. See id. at art. 21. 
48. See Makuc v. Slovn., Appl. No. 26828/06, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility, 
para. 160, Eur. Ct. H. R., 3d Sec., (May 31, 2007); Poenaru v. Rom., Appl. No. 51864/99, 
Decision as to the Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H. R., (Nov. 13, 2001); Karassev v. Finland, App. No. 
31414/96, Decision (Final) as to the Admissibility, Eur. Ct. H. R., 4th Sec., (Jan. 12, 1999); 
Family K. & W. v. Neth., App. No. 11278/84, Decision. at 216 Eur Comm’n H. R., July 1, 1985; 
X. v. Aust., App. No. 5212/71 Eur. Comm’n H. R., Oct. 5, 1972. 
49. See Protocol No. 4 to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already 
Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol thereto, Sep. 16, 1963, Eur. Treaty Series 
4; Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4, para. 23. 
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when it impacts other rights that are in the convention,50 for example, 
Article 8, the right to private and family life.51 The Court analyzes a 
violation of Article 8 by examining whether the nationality revocation 
was arbitrary and the consequences of the revocation.52 Arbitrariness 
is tested by whether the measure is provided in law,53 and whether there 
are procedural safeguards, both the possibility of judicial review54 and 
diligent action by the authorities.55 As a consequence, the ECtHR 
considers whether the individual is rendered stateless.56 Following 
these criteria, the Court has in the past found nationality revocation to 
have been permissible,57 although cases may arise in the future that will 
constitute a violation of Article 8. Other claims for violations have 
included Article 13 (right to an effective remedy), and Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 7 (ne bis in idem).58 
In addition to the ECHR, another convention under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe governs nationality issues: the European 
Convention on Nationality (ECN).59 It provides that everyone has a 
right to a nationality.60 Unfortunately it does not widespread adherence, 
but if a member state who was party to the Convention withdrew 
 
50. See Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48; Kafkasli v. Turk., Appl. No. 21106/92, 
Judgment (1995); Salahddin Galip v. Greece, Appl. No. 17309/90, Judgment (1995). 
51.  See K2 v U.K., Appl. No. 42387/13, Decision. on the Admissibility, para. 49 (2017); 
Ramadan v. Malta, Appl. No. 76136/12, Judgment, para. 85 (2016); Genovese v. Malta, Appl. 
No. 53124/09, paras. 30, Eur. Ct. H. R., (Oct. 11, 2011); Savoia & Bounegru v. It., App. No. 
8407/05, Decision (2006); Slivenko v. Lat., App. No. 48321/99, Decision, para. 77 (2002); 
Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48. 
52. See K2 v. U.K., supra note 51. 
53. See id. para. 50. 
54. See id. at para. 55. 
55. See id. at para. 50; Ramadan v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 86-89. 
56. See K2 v. U.K., supra note 51, para. 62.  
57. See id. 
58. See Protocol No. 7 to the [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Securing Certain Rights and Freedoms Other Than Those Already 
Included in the Convention and in the First Protocol Thereto, Sep. 16, 1963, Eur. Treaty Series 
117; Council of Eur., Parliamentary. Assembly, Resolution 2263 (2019) (Prov. ver.); 
Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human Rights-Compatible 
Approach?, http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25430 
[https://perma.cc/L9MJ-ALWQ];  see also Council of Eur., Parliamentary Assembly, 
Committee on Legal Aff. and Hum. Rts, Tineke Strik, Rapporteur, Report, Doc. 14790, 
Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human Rights-Compatible 
Approach? (2019), http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
en.asp?FileID=25241&lang=en [https://perma.cc/SND5-N68W]. 
59. See European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, E.T.S. 166. 
60. See id. 
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nationality contrary to its terms, then that withdrawal would be 
unlawful, for example, if revocation of nationality was only permitted 
for naturalized citizens.61 
2. International law 
International law also imposes some limitations on the ability of 
a state to revoke nationality. These limitations fall into several broad 
categories of statelessness, arbitrariness, and other miscellaneous 
obligations. International law, of course, binds the EU Member States. 
However, the European Commission has argued that, part of having 
due regard to Union law means having “due regard” to international 
law,62 suggesting that compliance with international law on nationality 
was additionally obliged by EU law. 
a. Statelessness 
Statelessness obligations primarily arise under treaty law.63 States 
that are party to the 1961 Statelessness Convention are under an 
obligation to prevent statelessness and reduce the number of cases of 
 
61. See id. art. 5.2; Council of Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution. 2263 (2019) 
(Prov. ver.), Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human Rights-
Compatible Approach?, available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?fileid=25430 [https://perma.cc/ZA47-E447]. 
62. See Case C-4/73, Nold Kohlen-und Baustoffgrobhandlung v. KG Comm’n Eur. 
Comm’ties, 1974 E.C.R. 492; Case C-181/73 Haegeman v Belgium, 1974 E.C.R. 450, para. 5; 
Case C-104/81 Kupferberg v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1982 E.C.R. 3644, para. 12; Case C-286/90, 
Anklagemindigheden v. Poulsen & Diva Navigation, 1992 E.C.R. I-6048, paras. 9-10; Case C-
162/96, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-3688, paras. 45-46; Case C-308/06, Queen 
on the App. of Int’l Assoc. of Indep. Taker Owners (Intertanko), et al. v. Sec’y St. Trans., 
Judgment, 2008 E.C.R., para. 38; Rottmannn v Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 28-29; Case C-
366/10, Air Transp. Assoc. Am. And Ors v Sec’y St. Energy & Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13833, paras. 73, 101 [hereinafter Air Transp. Case]; European Commission, Report from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Eur. Econ. and Soc. Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, at 5, COM (2019) 12 final (2019) (“Having due regard to EU law 
means taking into account all rules forming part of the Union legal order and includes having 
due regard to norms and customs under international law as such norms and customs form part 
of EU law”).  
63. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 8, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 
175 (hereinafter 1961 Statelessness Convention). Certainly this limitation applies to states party 
to the 1961 Statelessness Convention, but might also apply to states generally under customary 
international law. This author has argued elsewhere that such a rule applies under customary 
international law, but that argument will be omitted here because it is not necessary for the 
conclusions herein however, on this point see European Court of Human Rights, Kuric & Ors v. 
Slovenia, App. No. 26828/06, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2010). 
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statelessness.64 As of 2019, EU Member States that are party to the 
1961 Statelessness Convention include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
constituting the majority of the Member States. In addition, the 
European Union has itself pledged that all the states in the Union would 
adhere to the 1961 Statelessness Convention in the future,65 and the 
CJEU has stated that the creation of statelessness by withdrawing 
nationality would not be a legitimate revocation of Member State 
nationality.66  
There are a few exceptions to the prohibition on creating stateless. 
Necessarily, individuals with multiple nationalities may have their 
nationality removed without a violation of the statelessness rule.67 The 
convention itself provides that stateless may nonetheless be created in 
situations of (1) residence abroad seven or more years without 
declaration of intent to retain nationality;68 (2) taking up residence in 
the state for at least one year after attaining majority age, when born 
abroad;69 (3) fraud or misrepresentation in naturalization process;70 and 
(4) situations where the state has entered a reservation to the treaties 
for cases of loyalty, oaths, or services to foreign states, or acts 
“seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”71 
 
64. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, arts. 7(3), 8(1); see also Convention 
on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nat’lity Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, League of Nations 
Doc. C.224.M.111.1930.V (1930); League of Nations, Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of 
Statelessness, 12 April 1930, No. 4138. 179 L.N.T.S 115; Special Protocol Concerning 
Statelessness, League of Nations Doc. C.227.M.114, 1930 V (not yet entered into force). 
65. See Council of the European Union, Conclusions of the Council and the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States on Statelessness (Dec. 4, 2015), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5829c53a4.html [https://perma.cc/manage/create]. 
66. See, Tjebbes Case, supra note 8, para. 37. But see Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8 
(where the revocation of nationality would have rendered the applicant stateless). 
67. See generally William Thomas Worster, International Law and the Expulsion of 
Individual with More than One Nationality, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF’RS 423 (2009). 
68. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, arts. 7(4), 8(2)(a).  
69. See id. para. 7(5), 8(2)(a). 
70. See id. para. 8(2)(b). 
71. See id.  para. 8(3). 
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Some EU Member States have taken advantage of this option and 
entered a reservation. For example, the United Kingdom 
communicated the following to the depositary: 72 
“[The UK declares that it] retains the right to deprive a naturalised 
person of his nationality on the following grounds . . . that, 
inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to Her Britannic Majesty, 
the person (i) Has . . . rendered or continued to render services to, 
or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another 
State, or (ii) Has conducted himself in a manner seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of Her Britannic Majesty.” 
Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, and Spain 
have entered similar reservations,73 leaving only Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Sweden without the 
exception (4) above, but still retaining exceptions (1) through (3). 
All of the above means that an EU Member State may not, in 
principle, revoke the nationality of a person with only one nationality. 
The only exceptions would be when the individual has committed fraud 
in the naturalization process, has maintained extended residence 
aboard, or has never taken up residence in the state after being born 
abroad. In addition, Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Spain and the United Kingdom have the additional exception that they 
may also revoke nationality when the individual has acted in a manner 
that is “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State.”74 
b. Arbitrary or discriminatory measures 
Beyond these treaty provisions expressly covering statelessness, 
a number of other human rights treaties, in fact most other human right 
treaties provide for a right to a nationality.75 These treaties however, 
 
72. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Ch. V(4), Reservation Upon Ratification (Mar. 9, 1966), 
available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
4&chapter=5&lang=en#EndDec [https://perma.cc/5FSX-LMAU]. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. art. 3(a)(ii). 
75. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law art. 
1, Apr. 13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S 89; Protocol relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness, Apr. 12, 
1930, 179 L.N.T.S 115; G.A. Res. 1040, Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, 
paras. 1-3 (Jan. 29, 1957) [hereinafter CNMW]; G.A. Res. 61/177, Int’l Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, art. 25(4) (2007); Int’l Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5(d)(iii), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 
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contain several weaknesses, leaving states some discretion to revoke 
nationality lawfully. That being said, states are not completely free to 
revoke nationality when that revocation would be arbitrary. 
The obligation to ensure that every person enjoys a nationality has 
two significant weaknesses. The first weakness is that it only requires 
that an individual have “a” nationality, but does not clearly identify the 
state that must extend nationality. 76 However, for the instant question, 
when an individual has only one nationality, a state that revokes that 
nationality is creating a stateless person, and thus the state is clearly 
violating the individual’s right to a nationality. Prior to the revocation 
the individual had a nationality, and following the revocation, the 
individual does not have a nationality, due to the deliberate action of 
the state. 
The second weakness is that states may deprive individuals of 
their nationality under these human rights treaties, provided they do not 
act arbitrarily.77 The CJEU has recognized the restriction on arbitrary 
revocation of nationality as a “general principle of international law.”78 
Arbitrariness has been interpreted as having two meanings: procedural 
arbitrariness and substantive arbitrariness.79 Procedural arbitrariness 
results from a state acting without a legal basis for doing so,80  or not 
 
195 [hereinafter CERD]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  art. 24(3), Dec. 
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination against Women art. 9, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter 
CEDAW]; Int’l Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families art. 29, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter “CPMW”]; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Also see G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
76. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3) (“Every child has the right to acquire a 
nationality”); UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1). 
77. See U.N. Secretary-General, Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Report of the 
Secretary-General, para. 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/34 (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter Arbitrary 
Deprivation of Nationality]. 
78. See Rottmannn v. Bayern, supra note 8. 
79. See Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11,762, Inter-Am. Comm’n on H.R., Report 
No. 20/98, OEA/Ser. L./V/II.95, doc. 5 rev para. 95 (2001); Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Nationality, supra note 73; Human Rights Council, UN Secretary-General & UNHCHR, 
Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality (Jan. 26, 2009), para. 61 et seq.; U.N. Secretary-General, 
Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, para. 40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 
14, 2009) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2009]. 
80. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (“ELSI”) (U.S. v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 128 (July 20); 
see also Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 
20/98, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95, doc. 5 rev para. 95 (2001); Eri. v. Eth., Claims Comm’n, Partial 
Award: Civilian Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 44 I.L.M. 601, paras. 57-78 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004); 
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providing for effective legal process. 81 While this possibility may be 
implicated in cases of nationality revocation, it is not necessarily 
relevant, so we will not discuss it any further. 
Substantive arbitrariness, however, is very relevant. Substantive 
arbitrariness is linked to the notion that laws must be proportionate to 
their legitimate objectives.82 For example, some actions are almost 
always considered substantively arbitrary, most importantly, 
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, etc.83 Where 
revocation of nationality is motivated by discrimination on protected 
grounds, then the revocation will be unlawful.84 One ground of 
 
Explanatory Report to the European Convention on Nationality, Council of Europe 166, 36 
(1997) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/166.htm [https://perma.cc/BH9A-
HNCU] (providing that denaturalization “must in general be foreseeable, proportional and 
prescribed by law”) [hereinafter Explanatory Report: Nationality]. 
81. See U.N., Hum. Rts. Committee, No 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999) [hereinafter “Freedom of Movement”]; U.N. Secretary-
General, Hum. Rts. and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, paras. 43-46, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/13/34 (Dec. 14, 2009); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rts. and Arbitrary Deprivation 
of Nationality, para. 40, U.N. Doc A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2013); Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft 
Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in relation to the Succession of States, with 
commentaries, U.N. Doc A/54/10, at 38 (1999). 
82. See ICCPR, supra note 71, art. 26; see also Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (“ELSI”) (U.S. 
v. It.), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 128 (July 20); Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 I.C.J. 
284 (“Arbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something opposed to 
the rule of law”); Freedom of Movement, supra note 81, para. 21; Van Alphen v. Neth., Hum. 
Rts. Comm., No. 305/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, 5 (1990); A v Aust’lia, Hum. 
Rts. Comm., No 560/1993, UN Doc CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993, 9 (1997); Stewart v. Can., Hum. 
Rts. Comm., No. 538/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993 (1996), (Evatt & Medina 
Quiroga, Indiv. Op.; Aguilar Urbina, Dissent, para. 8); Eri. v. Eth., Claims Comm’n, Partial 
Award: Civilian Claims (Eri. v. Eth.), 44 I.L.M. 601 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2004), 44 I.L.M 601 (Eri. 
Award), paras. 57-78. 
83. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 65, art. 9; CERD, supra 
note 75; CEDAW supra note 71, art. 9(1); G.A. Res., Draft International Declaration of Human 
Rights, E/800, UN Doc A/C.3/SR.123, 352 (Nov. 5, 1948) (Eleanor Roosevelt: “individuals 
should not be subjected to action such as was taken during the Nazi regime in Germany when 
thousands had been stripped of their nationality by arbitrary government action”); G.A. Res. 
10/13 para. 2-3 (March 26, 2009); H.R.C. Res. 20/5, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/20/5, at 2-4 (July 
16, 2012); H.R.C. Res.7/10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/20/5, at 2-3; International Law Commission, 
Draft Articles Nationality in relation to the Succession of States, art. 15 (prohibiting 
discrimination “on any ground”). 
84. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(2); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CERD, supra 
note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 18, G.A. Res. 
61/106, 76th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD]; see also 
European Convention on Nationality, supra note 76, arts. 3(2), 5(1); Karassev v. Finland, supra 
note 48; Inst. for Hum. Rts. & Dev. in Africa (“IHRDA”) and Open Soc. Just. Initiative on 
Behalf of Children of Nubian Descent in Kenya v. The Gov’t of Kenya. No. Com/002/2009, 
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prohibited discrimination is specifically important in this case and that 
is discrimination between nationals based on whether they acquired 
their nationality by birth or by subsequent naturalization.85 
Other cases not involving prohibited discrimination are tested for 
proportionality, meaning that the objective of the revocation must be 
legitimate and the measures taken must be tailored to the objective. The 
Human Rights Council, UN Secretary-General and UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) have concluded that that 
revocation of nationality resulting in statelessness is necessarily 
substantively arbitrary. 86 Setting aside the creation of statelessness, 
other views help inform us of when revocation would be proportionate. 
The Human Rights Committee has concluded in General Comment No. 
27 that states may not revoke nationality merely as a means to expel a 
person and that there are “few, if any, circumstances in which 
deprivation of the right to enter one’s own country could be 
reasonable.”87 The ECN takes a slightly more liberal position, 
suggesting which cases might fall in this limited exception, by 
providing for several cases that will not be considered substantively 
arbitrary. Those cases are limited to: voluntary acquisition of another 
nationality; acquisition of the nationality by fraud or deception; 
voluntary service in a foreign military force; conduct seriously 
prejudicial to the vital interests of the state; lack of a genuine link 
 
African Committee of Experts on the Rts. and Welfare of the Child, para. 57 (March 22, 2011); 
Case of Girls Yean & Bosico v. Dom. Rep., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) paras. 136, 139, 141 (Sept. 8, 2005); Expelled Dominicans & Haitians v. Dom. 
Rep., Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 263 (Aug. 28, 2014); 
H.R. Council, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar, 
paras. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/23/L.9 (Nov. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Myanmar 
Report]; H.R. Council, Draft Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: 
Austria, paras. 5.4, 5.5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/23/L.20 (Nov. 11, 2015) [hereinafter Austria 
Report]; Hum. Rts and Arbitrary Deprivation of nationality: report of the Secretary-General, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34, art. 4 (Dec. 14, 2009); Dimitry Kochenov, EU Influence on the 
Citizenship Policies of the Candidate Countries: The Case of the Roma Exclusion in the Czech 
Republic, 3 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 124 (2007). 
85. See Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human Rights-
Compatible Approach EUR., PARL. ASS., RES. 2263 (2019); see also Withdrawing Nationality 
as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a Human Rights-Compatible Approach?, EUR., PARL. ASS. 
Doc. 14790 (2019). 
86. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 8; Arbitrary Deprivation Report 
2009, supra note 79; European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, art. 7(3).  
87. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999).  
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between the state and a national habitually residing abroad; or failure 
of a child to fulfill preconditions established by law.88 All other 
grounds are unreasonable. The Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission 
agreed with this approach in part when it held that withdrawal of 
nationality was proportionate in cases where when the person presents 
a serious security risk or holds another nationality.89 
c. Other issues 
In addition to the major issues of statelessness and the right to a 
nationality, there are several other obligations that states may violate 
when they revoke nationality, rending the revocation unlawful. Two 
examples will be briefly mentioned here: rights of the child and 
obligations for international criminal justice. 
First, all Member States of the European Union are parties to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”). The Convention 
requires states to consider the best interests of the child in all decisions 
pertaining to children,90 and especially for those rights enumerated in 
the CRC, specifically, such as the right to a nationality. If a state 
proposes to revoke a child’s nationality, either alone or in conjunction 
with the revocation of the parent’s nationality, that decision must be 
motivated by being in the best interests of the child. 91 However, 
numerous bodies have expressed the view that becoming stateless is 
never in the best interests of a child. 92 The only way to overcome this 
obligation would be a very strong showing that having the nationality 
of an EU Member State (and potentially having EU citizenship) was 
not in the child’s interests, and it is difficult to understand how a child 
would be better off with that result. 
 
88. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, arts. 5(1), 7(3). 
89. See Eri. v. Eth., supra note 76, at paras. 57-78. 
90. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sep. 2, 1990 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
91. See U.N. Secretary-General, Status of the Convention of the Rights of the Child, U.N. 
Doc. A/68/257 (Aug. 2, 2013), para. 57 et seq. 
92. See CRC, supra note 90, art. 3; Hum. Rts. Comm., Gen. Comm. 17, para. 8, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1989); CRC, Comm. Rts. Child, UN Doc. CRC/C/CZE/CO/3-4 (Aug 4, 
2011); U.N.H.C.R., Guidelines on Statelessness, No. 4, para. 11, HCR/GS/12/04 (Dec. 21, 
2012); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, art. 4, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec.13, 2013) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2013]; Ofc. 
High Comm’r Hum. Rts., The Rights of the Child, Fact Sheet No.10 (Rev.1) (1997). Afr. Comm. 
Children, Gen. Comm. 2, ACERWC/GC/02 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“being stateless as a child is 
generally an antithesis to the best interests of children”). 
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Secondly, abolishing the link of nationality may violate the 
Member State’s obligations to cooperate in prosecuting international 
crimes. All EU Member States are parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The Court acquires 
complementary jurisdiction over individuals who they either commit 
crimes within the territories of states parties to the Rome Statute or 
simply have the nationality of a state party to the Rome Statute and 
commit crimes anywhere.93 Setting aside crimes that are committed in 
states parties, it may be that the only way that the Court has jurisdiction 
over certain persons is due to them holding the nationality of an EU 
Member State. If that nationality is withdrawn, then the Court’s 
jurisdiction is abolished. The Rome Statute obliges states to exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over individuals responsible for international 
crimes when they have it,94 and to cooperate with the ICC in 
investigation and prosecution.95 It is certainly arguable that by 
withdrawing the nationality of nationals who may have committed 
international crimes (e.g. through association with ISIS), the EU 
Member State is terminating the jurisdiction of the ICC over these 
persons, and not cooperating with the potential prosecution of persons 
by the Court.96 Similarly, the UN Security Council in Resolution 2178 
has ordered all states to cooperate in combating terrorism, including 
exercising controls over their nationals. By revoking nationality, the 
Member State would be unilaterally renouncing its ability to exercise 
certain controls, and, again, might be refusing to cooperate with the 
 
93. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (“2. In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the 
Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this 
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with paragraph 3: (a) The 
State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred . . . (b) The State of which the 
person accused of the crime is a national”) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
94. See id. at preamble (“The States Parties to this Statute, . . . Recalling that it is the duty 
of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes . . .”). 
95. See id. art. 86, (“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, 
cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”). 
96. The EU Member States would still retain jurisdiction over the person and crimes, 
should the person appear in the state’s jurisdiction, under the concept of universal jurisdiction 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. But by terminating nationality, the claim 
of active nationality jurisdiction by the state is also foregone. 
788 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:3 
Security Council’s order. Certainly the Council of Europe believes this 
to be the case.97 
B. Refusal of nationality 
Having discussed the possibilities when the revocation of 
nationality would be unlawful, we now turn to the unlawful refusal to 
grant nationality. In some ways the refusal to grant nationality is a 
harder case to make as an unlawful act. After all, revocation of 
nationality brings up a sense of loss of acquired rights, whereas refusal 
to grant nationality denies the person from acquiring more rights. At 
first glance, states appear to have rather unfettered discretion in 
determining who acquires their nationality as an inherent aspect of 
sovereignty. Certainly, they appear to have considerable freedom in 
establishing which kinds of links are sufficient to create the necessary 
bond between the individual and the state. While that distinction 
between loss and acquisition of nationality is important, in some ways 
refusal to grant nationality is perhaps better protected, at least for 
certain situations, such as children born stateless. We will examine 
these situations under European regional law and general international 
law.  
1. European regional law 
EU law imposes some protections from revocation of nationality 
on Member States, but it is significantly less protective in cases of 
refusal of nationality. Quite simply, without acquiring nationality, and 
thus EU citizenship, EU law does not apply. While EU law on the 
protection from refusal of EU citizenship is less demanding than in 
cases of revocation, the Charter rights do still apply to all persons in 
the European Union, regardless of nationality. As such, EU Member 
States should not be able to refuse nationality where this refusal is 
 
97. See U.N.S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014); Resolution Withdrawing Nationality as a 
Measure to Combat Terrorism: A Human Rights-Compatible Approach, EUR. PARL. DOC. No. 
2263 (2019), available at http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?fileid=25430 [https://perma.cc/2YTD-SWQ3]; see also Council of Europe, Tineke 
Rapp, Rapporteur, Report, Withdrawing Nationality as a Measure to Combat Terrorism: a 
Human Rights-Compatible Approach?, Doc. 14790 (2019) available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=25430 
[https://perma.cc/F7BH-B4XL].  
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imposed as a consequence of the exercise of Charter rights or where 
the refusal would impact Charter rights. 
Similarly, the ECtHR has ruled that the refusal to grant nationality 
can impact the enjoyment of rights under the ECHR. As noted above, 
the ECHR does not provide for a right to acquire a nationality.98 Once 
again, claims of that nature need to be articulated instead as claims for 
violations of other rights under the Convention, for example, the refusal 
of nationality might amount to a degrading treatment, contrary to 
Article 3.99 One difficulty is that it is unclear whether refusal of 
nationality can amount to an infringement of rights in the ECHR. For 
example, a claim under whether refusal of nationality can amount to an 
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) regarding the failure of the national 
authority to process a naturalization application was not successful.100 
Also unsuccessful was a claim that the refusal of nationality infringed 
the right to private life.101 
However, one situation where refusal of nationality has been 
found to amount to an ECHR violation is when refusal violates the right 
to social identity. In Mennonson, France refused to grant nationality to 
children conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), because such 
practice was contrary to French law. The Court disagreed that refusal 
of nationality was the correct result for children conceived through 
IVF. While it is within the authority of the French State to prohibit IVF, 
it was a violation of the right to social identity to refuse nationality to 
children born of French parents as a result.102 Similarly, the Court 
found that it was a violation of the right to social identity to refuse 
nationality in cases of state succession, where the individual should 
 
98. See Makuc v. Slovn., supra note 48; Poenaru v. Rom., supra note 48; Karassev v. 
Finland, supra note 48; Family K. & W. v. Neths, supra note 48; X. v. Austria, Appl. No. 
5212/71 Eur. Comm’n Human Rts., (Oct. 5, 1972). 
99. See Slepcik v. Neth. & Czech Rep., Appl. No. 30913/96, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts., 
(September 2, 1996) (referring to E. Afr. Asians v. UK., Appl. Nos. 4403-19/70, 4422-23/70, 
4434/70, 4443/70, 4476-78/70, 4486/70, 4501/70, 4526-30/70, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts., (Dec. 
14, 1973); Zeibek v Gr., Appl. No. 34372/97, Eur. Comm’n, Hum Rts., (May 21, 1997). 
100. See Laura van Waas, Fighting Statelessness and Discriminatory Nationality Laws in 
Europe, 14 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 243-60 (2014). 
101. See Family K & W v. Neths., supra note 48 (“the right to acquire particular 
nationality is neither covered by, nor sufficiently relate to, [article 8 in conjunction with article 
14] or any other provision of the convention”). 
102. See Genovese v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 30-33; Mennesson v. Fr., Appl. No. 
65192/11), Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts (June 26, 2014); Labassee v. Fr., Appl. No. 65941/11, Eur. Ct. 
Hum. Rts (June 26, 2014). 
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have acquired the nationality of the new state, now sovereign over the 
area of the person’s habitual residence.103 
One important consideration that makes the violation especially 
compelling is whether the refusal of nationality concerns a child who 
is born in the state and would be otherwise stateless. At least in a 
dissenting opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque argued that the ECHR 
obliges states to grant nationality to children born in their territories 
who would otherwise be stateless.104 While this view on protection 
under the ECHR might still be a minority opinion, the ECN expressly 
protects the acquisition of nationality specifically. In the ECN, 
everyone is granted a right to a nationality, which means, inter alia, 
that states must grant nationality to a child at birth when either parent 
is a national and a child is born in the state or where the child would be 
otherwise stateless.105 A similar provision is made in cases of state 
succession in the Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in 
relation to State Succession.106 Thus, if a Member State is a party to the 
ECN, then the protection against nationality refusal leading to 
statelessness is more certain than if the Member State is only party to 
the ECHR. 
2. International law 
In the section above, discussing the revocation of nationality, we 
already discussed a number of arguments where international law 
protected a person’s nationality. The primary two protections are the 
protection against statelessness and the protection of a right to “a” 
nationality (i.e., non-arbitrary revocation). However, the refusal to 
grant a nationality is a slightly different scenario than revocation. When 
 
103. See Fedorova v. Latvia, Appl. No. 69405/01, Dec., Eur. Ct. H. R., (Oct. 9, 2003). 
104. See Ramadan v. Malta, supra note 51, paras. 86-89; Kuric & Others v. Slovenia, 
Appl. No. 26828/06, Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts, (July 13, 2010). 
105. See European Convention on Nationality, supra note 59, art. 6; Arbitrary Deprivation 
Report 2013, supra note 92, art. 4. 
106. See Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession 
art. 10, May 19, 2006, Eur. Treaty Series No. 200; Eur. Comm’n for Democracy through Law 
at its 28th Plenary Meeting, Venice Commission Declaration on the Consequences of State 
Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons: Declaration on the Consequences of State 
Succession for the Nationality of Natural Persons, 13-14 (Sept. 1996); Council of Europe, 
Convention on the Avoidance of Statelessness in Relation to State Succession, Explanatory 
Report, art. 2, available at http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/200.htm 
[https://perma.cc/54BC-DXXJ]. 
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it comes to the grant of nationality, this act is usually based on one of 
two situations: birth or naturalization. Although a few other highly 
unusual options also exist, this paper will focus only on birth or 
naturalization. Similar concerns exist for refusal of nationality as did 
for revocation of nationality, when it pertains to the rights of the child 
and the child’s best interests.107 However, in this section, we will focus 
on the refusal of nationality at birth and by naturalization. 
a. Nationality at birth 
The protection against statelessness coves the refusal to grant 
nationality at birth.108 Recall that the 1961 Statelessness Convention 
prohibited denationalization of a person unless the grounds fell within 
a short list of permissible reasons for the revocation. However, none of 
the exceptions apply to the refusal of acquisition of nationality at birth; 
they all address the revocation of nationality already acquired. 
International law will oblige a state to grant nationality in the rare 
situation that a child would be stateless. This Author has written 
previously that, under customary international law, we must interpret 
the right to a nationality,109 and the protections against statelessness, to 
mean that a child born in a state will receive the nationality of that state 
if the child would otherwise be stateless.110 This author reaffirms this 
finding, but for purposes of this Article, we will not explore that line of 
argument further. 
Treaty law also imposes a similar obligation as customary 
international law, though only where the EU Member States are parties 
to the treaties. The 1961 Statelessness Convention commands that a 
 
107. See infra Sec. III.A.2.iii; see generally William Thomas Worster, The Obligation to 
Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Customary International Law, 27 MICH. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 441 (2019). 
108. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 8. Certainly this limitation 
applies to states party to the 1961 Statelessness Convention, but might also apply to states 
generally under customary international law. This Author has argued elsewhere that such a rule 
applies under customary international law, see, e.g., William Thomas Worster, The Obligation 
to Grant Nationality to Stateless Children Under Customary International Law, 27 MICH. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 441 (2019), but that argument will be omitted here because it is not necessary for 
the conclusions herein, however, on this point compare the positive view of the European Court 
of Human Rights, Kuric and Others v. Slovenia, Appl. No. 26828/06, (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts July 
13, 2010). 
109. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1); ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); CRC, supra 
note 90 art. 7; CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29. 
110. See generally Worster, supra note 107. 
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state grant nationality to stateless children born in the state’s territory, 
without exception. The right to a nationality under other human rights 
treaties does not explicitly provide for the state of birth to grant 
nationality to an otherwise stateless child, although they may be 
interpreted to impose that obligation. Various bodies have agreed that 
the right against arbitrary revocation of nationality also applies equally 
to arbitrary refusal.111 After all, when a child is born stateless, he or she 
is within the jurisdiction of only one state at the time of birth. There is 
only one state that may bear the obligation for the child to have “a” 
nationality. This conclusion is an exception to the general rule that we 
cannot usually identify the state that is obliged to secure the right to a 
nationality. Thus, the state where the stateless child is born must ensure 
that the child has a nationality, which could be by granting nationality 
or securing the child’s nationality from another state. For this reason, a 
state would act unlawfully if it refuses to grant a newly born child its 
nationality, unless the state effectively secures the child’s nationality 
from another state. So if a child effectively held another nationality at 
birth, then the birth state is excused from ranting its nationality.112 
In addition, other human rights may be relevant. For example, a 
refusal to grant nationality that is discriminatory on one of the protected 
grounds, 113 or results as punishment for the exercise of other human 
rights, will be problematic. Also, refusals to recognize the nationality 
of persons habitually resident in the territory of a new state would be 
problematic if they resulted in statelessness.114 
 
111. See 1961 Statelessness Convention, supra note 63, art. 1(1); ICCPR, supra note 75, 
art. 24(3); CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29; CRC, supra note 90, art. 7(1), (1990); Arbitrary 
Deprivation Report 2009, supra note 79, para. 60 (“In the context of the avoidance of 
statelessness, arbitrary denial of nationality is just as grave as arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality”); see generally U.N. Secretary-General, Impact of the Arbitrary Deprivation of 
Nationality on the Enjoyment of the rights of Children Concerned, and Existing Laws and 
Practices on Accessibility for Children to Acquire Nationality, inter alia, of the Country in 
Which They are Born, if They Otherwise Would be Stateless, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/29 (Dec. 16, 
2015) [hereinafter Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015]; Office High Comm’r Refugees, Exec. 
Comm. Concl. No. 106 (LVII) (2006), para. (i); H.R.C. Gen. Comm. 17, para. 8. 
112. See Karassev v. Finland, supra note 48. 
113. See CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CRPD, supra 
note 84, art. 18; Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2009, supra note 79, art. 4, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/13/34 (Dec.14, 2009); Myanmar Report, supra note 84, paras. 7.54, 7.55, 7.66; Austria 
Report, supra note 84, paras. 5.4, 5.5.  
114. See Human Rights Council Res. 32/5, U.N. Doc. A/62/53 (June 30, 2016) (“6. 
Encourages States to grant their nationality to persons who had habitual residence in their 
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b. Naturalization 
The refusal to extend nationality to a person in the naturalization 
process is the other scenario for refusal of nationality. Naturalization is 
a significantly different scenario from acquisition at birth.115 In 
naturalization, the state granting nationality often has considerably 
more discretion in deciding which persons qualify for nationality. At 
the outset, we should note that naturalization policies that discriminate 
on the impermissible bases of race, color, gender, religion, political 
opinion or national or ethnic origin, are highly suspect and most likely 
unlawful under international law.116 However, a state still retains broad 
authority to determine qualification, even setting aside the 
discriminatory grounds. In addition, although other instruments 
encourage naturalization, but do not necessarily mandate it. For 
example, the Refugee Convention obliges states to facilitate the 
naturalization of refugees.117 There are a few situations in which a state 
is expected to naturalize individuals. 
Under EU law, states have not had their discretion limited over 
laws providing for naturalization.118 In the Kaur case, the CJEU held 
 
territory before it was affected by the succession of States, especially if those persons would 
otherwise become stateless”). 
115. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 15(1); CNMW, supra note 75, arts. 1-3; ICCPR, supra 
note 75, art. 24(3); CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); CEDAW, supra note 75, at art. 9; CPMW, 
supra note 75, art. 29; CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18(1)-(1); H.R.C. Dec. 2/111 (27 Nov. 2006); 
H.R.C. Res. 13/2; H.R.C. Res. 10/13; H.R.C. Res. 7/10; H. R. Comm’n Res.1998/48 (17 Apr. 
1998); H.R.C. Res. 1999/28; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45 (19 Apr. 2005); H.R.C. Gen. Comm. 17, 
paras. 7-8; H.R.C. Res. 2005/45; CEDAW Gen. Recomm. No. 21: Equality in Marriage and 
Family Relations, 1994, art. 9. 
116. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CRC, supra 
note 90, arts. 7, 8; CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18 Comm. on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens (Oct. 
1, 2002) [hereinafter Discrimination Recommendation 2002]; Hum Rts. Comm. Gen Recomm. 
No. 24. 
117. See Convention relating to the Status of Refugees art. 34, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (“[Parties] 
shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees. They shall in 
particular make every effort to expedite naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as 
possible the charges and costs of such proceedings”). 
118. See Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8; Kaur Case, supra note 16; Micheletti Case, 
supra note 15; Eur. Council Dec. concerning certain problems raised by Denmark on the Treaty 
of European Union, Annex 3, section A ‘Citizenship’, Denmark and the Treaty on European 
Union, Dec. 31, 1992, O.J. (C 348) 1; First Report on the Citizenship of the Union, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. (COM 702) (1993) (“wherever in the Treaty establishing the European Community 
reference is made to nationals of the Member States, the question whether an individual 
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that a refusal by the United Kingdom to naturalize an application did 
not raise issues under EU law.119 The reasoning in that case is that, prior 
to the naturalization, the individual does not hold EU citizenship, so the 
protections of EU citizenship have not accrued to the person. It is a 
highly formalistic approach that does not engage with the problem of 
the Member State acting as a gatekeeper to EU citizenship. 
One possible argument is the duty of sincere cooperation among 
EU Member States.120 Recently the European Commission has 
produced a report criticizing the practice of some Member States that 
grant expedited nationality to wealthy investors, even without a 
residency or genuine connection requirement.121 These “citizenship-
by-investment” schemes not only grant EU Member State nationality, 
but also, necessarily, EU citizenship.122 Usually it is the EU citizenship 
that is the prize, permitting the individual to take up unfettered 
residence in London, Paris, Amsterdam, Rome, or Berlin rather than 
Valletta or Nicosia. A particularly problematic aspect of the Member 
State granting nationality accrued the benefit of the individual’s 
investment, but did not have to bear the burden of providing services 
to the new EU citizen who was resident in a more fashionable Member 
State. 
The Commission suggests that the citizenship by investment 
schemes constitute an infringement of the duty of sincere cooperation 
through the application of naturalization law. The Commission cited 
the Nottebohm case123 for the notion that nationality should only be 
acquired on the basis of a “genuine connection” to the state.124 
 
possesses the nationality of a Member State shall be settled solely by reference to the national 
law of the Member State concerned”); Third Report from the Commission on Citizenship of the 
Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 506) (2001); Fourth Report on Citizenship of the Union, EUR. 
PARL. DOC. (COM 695) (2004); Fifth Report on Citizenship of the Union, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
(COM 85) (2008). 
119. See Kaur Case, supra note 16. 
120. See TEU, supra note 5, art. 4(3). 
121. See Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, EUR. PARL. 
DOC. (COM 12) 22-23 (2019). 
122. See id.  
123. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 23. 
124. The Commission also offered its interpretation of a qualifying “genuine connection” 
to include “genuine connection with the people of the country (by descent, origin or marriage) 
or on a genuine connection with the country, established either by birth in the country or by 
effective prior residence in the country for a meaningful duration. Other elements may be 
required to attest to the existence of a genuine bond with the country, such as knowledge of a 
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However, the Commission additionally argued that, following 
Nottebohm, nationality granted by a state need only be recognized by 
other states where such genuine connection exists. It continued to argue 
that “[s]uch a common understanding of the bond of nationality 
[genuine connection under Nottebohm] also lies at the basis of Member 
States’ acceptance that Union citizenship and the rights entailed by it 
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
would accrue automatically to any person becoming one of their 
citizens.”125 While this is a correct statement of Nottebohm, this 
argument is in direct conflict with Micheletti. Under Micheletti, the 
European Union has a lex specialis regime on recognition of nationality 
so that Member States are not permitted to second-guess the grant of 
Member State nationality or give priority to another nationality, 
because such practice would impact the enjoyment of EU citizenship. 
Strange enough, the Commission also cites to Micheletti in its report. 
126 The conclusion of the Commission is that the only way for Member 
States to comply with Micheletti and yet also apply the Nottebohm 
criterion is for the Member State granting nationality to be obliged to 
apply Nottebohm.127 Thus, Member States should be required to apply 
the Nottebohm genuine link to their grants of nationality due to the duty 
of sincere cooperation under the Treaty on European Union 
(“TEU”).128 
Following from this report’s analysis, the duty of sincere 
cooperation, which requires EU Member States to apply international 
law to the acquisition of nationality, limits Member State discretion in 
granting nationality. While an individual might not have a claim against 
a Member State for refusal of nationality as per Kaur, the other Member 
States of the Union might have a claim under Article 4(3) of the TEU. 
However, it is yet unclear what the duty of sincere cooperation may 
require in terms of requiring the grant of nationality contrasted with 
 
national language and/or of the culture of the country, links with the community.” Investor 
Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union, supra note 121, at 5. 
125. See id. at 5. 
126. See id. (citing Case C-369/90, Micheletti & Others v Delegación del Gobierno en 
Cantabria 1992 E.C.R. I-4253). 
127. See id. at 6 (“each Member State needs to ensure that nationality is not awarded 
absent any genuine link to the country or its citizens”). 
128. See id. at n.31 (“The principle of sincere cooperation with other Member States and 
the Union laid down by Article 4(3) TEU, obliges Member States to refrain from measures that 
could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives”). 
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obliging Member States to refuse the grant nationality. After all, the 
Commission cited the impact on EU citizenship in Rottmann (which 
concerned the revocation of Member State nationality) to support its 
conclusion on the impact of citizenship by investment schemes 
(concerning the grant of Member State nationality).129 Apparently, 
revocation of nationality and the grant of nationality are governed by 
the same principles of due regard for EU law. There may be a trend 
towards further erosion of Member State discretion in granting 
nationality through naturalization in the future. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE UNLAWFUL DENIAL OF 
NATIONALITY 
The above sections detailed the many ways in which the 
revocation or refusal of EU Member State nationality might violate EU 
law or international law. This discussion did not attempt to be 
completely thorough and definitive, other than to simply highlight that 
the revocation or refusal of nationality can be unlawful. These 
protections vary from situation to situation with comparably stronger 
protection in the case of revocation to relatively weaker protection in 
the case of refusal. If a state refuses or revokes nationality in a way that 
violates one of these provisions above, then the next question is the 
impact on an individual’s EU citizenship. 
The initial step in this analysis is to identify which actor would be 
responsible for breaching international law by denying nationality.130 
The EU Member State refusing or revoking nationality would surely 
be responsible since the norms described above are binding on states.131 
But while the Member State has violated international law, that 
violation does not automatically result in reversing the decision in 
 
129. See id. at 5 (“The Court of Justice of the EU has held, in what is now settled case-
law, that, while it is for each Member State to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and 
loss of nationality, they must do so having due regard to Union law”). See also Micheletti Case, 
supra note 15; Case C-179/98, Belg. v. Mesbah, 1999 E.C.R. I-07955; Case C-192/99, Kaur 
Case, supra note 16; Zhu & Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep’t, supra note 8; 
Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8; Tjebbes Case, supra note 8.  
130. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep.: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, art 2, (2001), 
[hereinafter Draft Articles on State Responsibility]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep: Draft Articles on 
the Responsibility of International Organizations, with commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, art. 4 
(2011) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations]. 
131. See Draft articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 13.  
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domestic law to deny nationality. Thus, EU citizenship would not 
necessarily be restored in the eyes of the Member State. The following 
paragraphs will examine the separate consideration of whether other 
EU Member States or the Union itself might also be responsible if they 
give recognition to the wrongful decision of the Member State.  
To begin this analysis, we start with the obligation on all Member 
States to give effect to EU citizenship. The TFEU states that an 
individual has EU citizenship when he or she is “holding” the 
nationality of a Member State.132 Implicitly, “holding” is the exclusive 
way to acquire EU citizenship, not merely one method of many.133 
However, the rule of “holding” as stated in the TFEU is not complete. 
As noted above, there are other ways that individuals can be excluded 
from EU citizenship despite “holding” Member State nationality.134 In 
addition, the provision does not state that EU citizenship is lost upon 
loss of the Member State nationality, nor does it clearly state that EU 
citizenship is lost upon the withdrawal of a Member State from the 
 
132.  See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 20(1), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J. 
(C 326) 56. See also Directive 2004/38/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
29 April 2004 on the Right of Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and 
Reside Freely Within the Territory of the Member States Amending Regulation (EEC) N0 
1612/68 and Repealing Directives 64/221/EEC. Case C-413/99, Baumbast, supra note 8; Case 
C-224/98, D’Hoop v. Office National de l’emploi, 2002 E.C.R. I-06191. 
133. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 359 (noting that a state joining the European 
Union, and becoming an EU Member State, is the one exception to the usual rule that a person 
only acquires EU citizenship when he or she acquires EU Member State nationality; in this case, 
the person acquires the nationality and EU citizenship at separate moments). 
134. Cf. Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), art. 
355(5) (ex. art. 299(2), 1st sub-para. & art 299(3)-(6) TEC), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J. (C 326) 198  
(“the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe Islands”) with Treaty amending, with regard to 
Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, 13 Mar. 1984, 1985 O.J. (L 
29). See also Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated Version), art. 
355(5)(c) (ex. art 299(2), 1st sub-par. & art 299(3)-(6) TEC), Oct. 10, 2012, O.J. (C 326) 198 
(“the Treaties shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary 
to ensure the implementation of . . . the European Economic Community and . . . European 
Atomic Energy Community”); Note From the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland to the Government of the Italian Republic Concerning a Declaration by the Government 
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Replacing the Declaration on the 
Definition of the Term “National” Made at the Time of Signature of the Treaty of Accession of 
January 22, 1972 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European 
Communities, from R. Arculus, Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Rome, to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Italy (Dec. 31, 1982) U.K.T.S. 67 (1983) (“a) British citizens; b) Persons who are 
British subjects by virtue of Part IV of the British Nationality Act 1981 . . .”); Treaty of 
Accession to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1st U.K. Declaration, Jan. 22, 1972, 1972 O.J. 
(L 73), 196. 
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Union.135 Although this automatic loss of EU citizenship could be 
implied by the present tense of the verb “holding,” and Rottmann seems 
to suggest that conclusion, the strong norms against loss of nationality 
in international law might argue against this assumption.136 
Nonetheless, “holding” appears to be the, probably exclusive, test for 
the acquisition of EU citizenship, with other rules pertaining to 
exceptions to the “holding” rule. 
“Holding” could have one of several meanings. Generally, it 
suggests a de facto grasping of nationality, yet we also frequently say 
that we can “hold” a claim of right despite not presently enjoying it in 
fact. By contrast, the TFEU does not say that a person has EU 
citizenship “upon confirmation of Member State nationality” or “upon 
production of a member State passport,” or some similar phrase.137 
Where a person has lost his or her passport or national identity card, he 
or she is still an EU citizen, though evidentiary issues may be 
challenging in such a case. We could even imagine a situation where a 
Member State acknowledged that the person holds its nationality, yet 
refuses to print a passport for some, possibly unlawful, reason.  In these 
cases, we recognize that the person “holds” the right to nationality. The 
terms in the TFEU are phrased not as a de facto enjoyment or 
evidencing of nationality, but as a consequential operation of law. 
Thus, we should more correctly understand the term “holding” to mean 
that if a person holds Member State nationality by right of law, then he 
or she holds EU citizenship, also by right of law. 
In addition, the TFEU should be interpreted consistent with 
international law, including, inter alia, the rules on interpreting 
treaties138 and the rules on responsibility,139 but also primary rules such 
as the right to a nationality. This is not to say that international law 
overrules the TFEU, but that, when ambiguous, the treaty should be 
 
135. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9, at 341. Equally it does not state that EU citizenship 
is acquired when a state joins the EU. Again, that effect is deduced from the language in the 
TEU. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See supra note 132. 
138. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
139. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 
125, at 53, art. 4. See generally THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION: EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Malcom Evans & Panos Koutrakos 
eds., 2013). 
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read in compliance with international law. While EU citizenship is not 
a nationality in the sense of being a legal bond with a state, it is a legal 
bond with the Union, and international law protections on nationality 
focus on the legal bond as the status that is being protected.140 After all, 
the Member State could have used any number of different terms in the 
Treaties on European Union than “citizenship” to describe this status, 
and yet they deliberately choose to use it. Like nationality, citizenship 
is also necessarily a status expressing a legal bond with a state. If the 
Union can contemplate a “citizenship,” then it should have sufficient 
capacity to contemplate a legal bond. Mutatis mutandis, international 
law should protect EU citizenship in a similar manner as protection of 
nationality. If international law would prohibit states from refusing 
nationality, then the terms in the TFEU should be read that way as well. 
This possibility to independently inquire into whether a person 
holds Member State nationality, and thus EU citizenship, should be 
distinguished from Micheletti. In that case, the CJEU held that when 
nationality was granted, other Member States cannot refuse to 
recognize it.141 Here, the question is where nationality was refused, 
whether other Member States must recognize that refusal. In a sense, 
the receiving Member State is refusing to recognize an act of state of 
the other Member State, but surely the receiving Member State is not 
prohibited from taking a more generous view in favor of the person.  
Having considered that the TFEU can be interpreted to permit a 
receiving Member State to recognize nationality, even when the 
original Member State is denying nationality, we next consider whether 
a refusal to consider the person an EU citizen would be unlawful. The 
other Member States of the Union could be faced with a person whose 
nationality has been revoked or refused by one of the sister states in the 
European Union. The Member State receiving the person will need to 
determine how to address the situation if the individual claims that this 
denial is wrongful, and if he or she actually enjoys EU citizenship and 
rights such as free movement. While the initial denial of nationality 
would be unlawful, the receiving state will have to take separate 
decisions in reaction to the unlawful act. For example, the receiving 
Member State would have to decide if the person was an EU citizen for 
purposes of admission and expulsion, rights to remain and seek 
employment, voting in certain elections, and so on. Because these are 
 
140. See Worster, Brexit, supra note 9 at 357.  
141. See Micheletti Case, supra note 15, para. 15. 
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distinct acts, and the TFEU would permit a state to interpret “holding” 
liberally, a Member State recognizing an unlawful denial of nationality 
would be committing its own distinct unlawful act. 
A similar analysis applies to the Union itself. Of course, EU law 
applies to the Union, but the other obligations under international law 
mentioned in the previous sections also apply.142 The Union, as a 
separate legal person, will see that its Member States disagree over the 
nationality of an individual, with one outcome favoring EU citizenship 
and the other not. If the issue comes before the Union, perhaps by 
referring the case to the CJEU or if the individual is a candidate for 
European Parliamentary election or applies for an employment position 
with the organs of the Union,143 the Union will need to determine 
whether the person enjoys EU citizenship. The reasoning above 
suggests that an individual appearing in a Member State, claiming 
nationality in another Member State and EU citizenship, but whose 
original Member State refuses to acknowledge nationality, might 
nonetheless “hold” nationality sufficient for EU citizenship. If a 
Member State refuses to recognize that EU citizenship that the person 
holds by right, then the Member State would have violated European 
law. 
A. Obligation of cessation 
The following sections will examine the various obligations that 
accrue to a state when it has violated international law, and will apply 
those obligations to the Member State refusing nationality, the Member 
State recognizing that refusal, and the Union itself. Under the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, the first, and the most obvious, 
obligation of a state, when it is responsible for an internally wrongful 
 
142. E.g., Nold Kohlen-und Baustoffgrobhandlung v. KG Comm’n Eur. Comm’ties, supra 
note 62; Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-03655; 
Case C-286/90 Ankagemyndigheden v. Poulsen & Diva Navigation Corp., 1992 E.C.R. I-06019; 
Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P. Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v Council Eur. Union & 
Comm’n Eur. Comm’ties, 2008 E.C.R. I-06351 [hereinafter Kadi Case]; Case C-366/10, Air 
Transp. Case, supra note 62. 
143. See, e.g., Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Protocol No. 3 on the 
Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art. 3(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 
210, (“Any person who is a Union citizen and fulfils the conditions laid down . . . may submit 
an application. The Council, acting on a recommendation from the Court of Justice, shall 
determine the conditions and the arrangements governing the submission and processing of such 
applications”). 
2020] EUROPEAN UNION CITIZENSHIP 801 
act or omission is to cease the act144 and not repeat it.145 Needless to 
say that the above principles are also equally applicable to all 
international organizations, as expressed in the Draft Articles on the 
Responsibility of International Organizations,146 including the 
European Union.147 International law governing nationality interprets 
the obligation to cease as an obligation to restore or reinstate nationality 
when it is unlawfully denied.148 This obligation is equally applicable to 
international organizations that act unlawfully.149 This obligation is not 
particularly controversial and would require the Member State 
unlawfully refusing nationality to restore it. Also, as the other Member 
States and the Union are taking separate, independent action in 
applying the TFEU, it is arguable that the other Member States and the 
Union must recognize EU citizenship when a Member State has 
unlawfully refused nationality. This latter obligation only pertains to 
EU citizenship because that is the only legal obligation applicable to 
the Member State; it does not necessarily apply to the recognition of 
Member State nationality. While it may seem incoherent to recognize 
 
144. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 29 (“The legal 
consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this Part do not affect the continued duty 
of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached.”); Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 30 (“The State responsible for the internationally wrongful 
act is under an obligation: (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing”).  
145. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 30 (“The State 
responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: . . . (b) to offer 
appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require”). 
146. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 
125, arts. 41(1), 42(2); see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, 167, para. 159 (July 
9); U.N.S.C. Res. 662 para. 2 (Aug. 9, 1990) (calling on “all States, international organizations 
and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation, and to refrain from any action or 
dealing that might be interpreted as an indirect recognition of the annexation”). 
147. See European Community, Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the 
Recognition of New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (reproduced in 31 Int’l L. Mats. 1485, 
1487 (1992)) (articulating the rule of nonrecognition of results of acts of aggression). 
148. See Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015, supra note 111, at 5-6 (“States must provide 
a child who has been illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of his or her identity with 
appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her 
identity”). An effective remedy must also be available in the context of arbitrary deprivation of 
nationality (see A/HRC/13/34, A/HRC/25/28 and CRC/C/DOM/CO/3-5) . . . Where children 
have, in contravention of international law, been arbitrarily deprived of their nationality and 
rendered stateless, States must ensure that effective and appropriate remedies are available, 
including reinstatement of nationality”). 
149. See Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 
125, arts. 29, 30, 42(2).  
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EU citizenship without necessarily recognizing Member State 
nationality, we can recall that the TFEU only requires Member States 
to give effect to EU citizenship.150 
B. Obligation to refuse to recognize an unlawful act 
In addition, when a state acts unlawfully, other states are required 
to refuse to recognize the unlawful act.151 This section will consider 
whether a Member State or the Union is obliged to constructively 
recognize EU citizenship when Member State nationality is being 
refused unlawfully, or whether that is merely a permissible reading of 
the TFEU. It will also go beyond the obligation of cessation because 
that obligation only pertains to EU citizenship specifically. 
1. Jus cogens 
States are not permitted to recognize the consequences of jus 
cogens violations as lawful or render aid to the state concerned to 
maintain the unlawful situation.152 The nonrecognition covers the 
outcomes of the unlawful acts, and includes reactions that expressly or 
implicitly recognize the new situation.153 The unlawful acts should be 
treated as having “no legal validity . . . [being] considered null and 
void.”154 
The second obligation incumbent on states when there is a 
violation of jus cogens norms is to require the state to refuse to aid or 
 
150. See supra note 132. 
151. See infra Secs. IV.B.1-2. 
152. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40 (“1. This chapter 
applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law”); (“2. No State shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation”); see also id. art. 41; E. Timor Case (Port. 
v. Aust’lia), Juris., Judgement, 1995 ICJ Reps. 103-4; Legal Conseq. for Sts. of the Cont. 
Presence of S. Afr. in Namibia (SW Afr.) notwithstanding SC Res. 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia Opinion]. But see SC Res. 276 (1970), 
Adv. Op., 1971 ICJ Reps. 16, 55-6 (June 21); Cyprus v. Turkey, Appl. No. 25781/94 Eur. Ct. 
H. R. 17 (2001); Brcko Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute Over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brcko 
Area (Rep. Srpska v. Fed. Bosnia & Herzegovina), Award, paras. 77-78 (Feb. 14, 1997), 
reprinted at 36 INT’L L. MATS. 396; JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
135 (1987); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 420-21 (1948). 
153. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(5). 
154. See e.g. U.N.S.C. Res. 662 (Aug. 9, 1990). 
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otherwise assist in the unlawful act.155 This obligation is more than the 
obligation to simply not help another state violate its obligations, as 
covered in Draft Articles on State Responsibility Article 11,156 and this 
provision specifically targets acts that aid in maintaining an unlawful 
situation.157 
We will next consider whether the rules against denial of 
nationality constitute jus cogens norms. It is quite an understatement to 
say that proving the existence of a jus cogens norm is exceedingly 
difficult. As Ian Brownlie concluded, “more authority exists for the 
category of jus cogens than exists for its particular content.”158 A 
decision of whether an act amounts to a violation of a jus cogens norm 
is often contained in a UN Security Council decision, 159 but that is not 
a necessary condition for the act to have such character.160 At a basic 
level, the rule includes any provision that is non-derogable,161 though 
as a test for jus cogens nature, this statement is likely to be too broad. 
One approach is to determine which norms protect “the survival of 
States and their peoples and the most basic human values.”162 More 
specifically, the rule could qualify as jus cogens if it covers “the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights.”163 
 
155. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(2) (“No State shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of article 40, nor 
render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation.”); id. art. 41(4). 
156. See id. art. 11. 
157. See id. arts. 41(11), 41(12). See also U.N.S.C. Council Res. 218 (Nov. 23, 1965); 
U.N.S.C. Res. 418 (Nov. 4, 1977); U.N.S.C. Res. 569 (July 26, 1985). 
158. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 516-17 (1999). 
159. See, e.g., U.N.G.A. Res. 68/262 (Mar. 24, 2014); U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 
6, para. 3 (Dec. 14, 1974); U.N.G.A. Res. 2734 (XXV), para. 5 (Dec. 16, 1970); U.N.G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970). 
160. See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Op, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 141 paras. 132–37 (July 22) 
(separate opinion by Cançado Trindade, J.) [hereinafter Kosovo Declaration]; Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Proj. (Hung./Slovak.), 1997 I.C.J Reps. 7, 54, 78 (Sept. 25); LAUTERPACHT, supra 
note 143, at 421. 
161. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(2) (“In accordance 
with article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law 
is one which is: ‘accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole 
as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”). 
162. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(3) (“. . . substantive 
rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of the threat it 
presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human values”). 
163. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 282, 303 et seq. 
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These rules are elevated to having jus cogens quality due to 
“considerations of morals and international good order.”164 
Another approach is to look at commonalities in the existing rules 
of jus cogens. Examples of norms that have been understood to have 
this character include the prohibition of aggression,165 piracy,166 
slavery,167 genocide,168 racial discrimination,169 apartheid,170 and 
torture,171 as well as rules requiring the basic rules of international 
humanitarian law,172 and self-determination.173 In any event, the 
various experts, negotiators and judiciaries agree that the examples of 
jus cogens norms were not exhaustive.174 Other possible jus cogens 
norms mentioned at the negotiations over the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) include the rules of state equality,175 
 
164. See U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/115 [2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 1958] (Fitzmaurice) [hereinafter 
Fitzmaurice]. See also U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 54th mtg. at 311, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF. 39/11 (May 6, 1968) (Italy: Maresca) (“mankind’s awareness of the law” and 
“the conscience of mankind.). 
165. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); Fitzmaurice, 
supra note 164; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, supra note 155, at 311 (1968) (Italy: Maresca) 
(discussing rules that “ensured the maintenance of peace”); U.N.G.A. Conf. Law of Treaties, 1st 
sess., 52nd mtg, paras. 3, 31, & 43; 53rd mtg., paras. 4, 9, 15, 16, 35, 48, 59, & 69; 54th mtg, 
paras. 9, 41, 46; 55; 55th mtg, paras. 31 & 42; 56th mtg, paras. 6, 20, 29, & 51. 
166. Fitzmaurice, supra note 164; Documents of the 5th Session Including the Report of 
the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/ON.4/SER.A/1953/Add.1 [2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 1953]. 
167. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); 2 Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 1953, supra note 166. 
168. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); Crim (Jer) 40/61 
AG v. Eichmann (1961) (Isr.) (reprinted at 36 INT’L L. MATS. 5). 
169. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(4); U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, & Uruguay). 
170. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 126, art. 40(4); U.N.S.C. Res. 
217, para. 3 (Nov. 20, 1965). 
171. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art.40(5); Al-Adsani v. 
UK, App. No. 35763/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 61 (2001); R. v Bartle & Comm’r Police for the 
Metro. [1999] UKHL 17 (appeal) (UK). 
172. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(5); U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF. 39/11, paras. 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, Ukraine, & Uruguay). 
173. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 40(5); U.N.G.A. Res. 
2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, at 121 (Oct. 
24, 1970). 
174. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, arts. 40(3), 40(6); 
Fiztmaurice, supra note 164. 
175. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 311 (1968) (Italy: Maresca) (discussing rules that 
maintained “the existence and equality of States”). 
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freedom of the high seas,176 and the prohibition on colonialism 
(perhaps as part of the right to self-determination).177 In addition, the 
delegates specifically discussed the protection of the person as a jus 
cogens norm,178 which might narrowly cover only certain fundamental 
human rights179 or more broadly cover most human rights.180 CJEU 
jurisprudence suggests that the obligation of states to admit their own 
nationals to their territory,181 and the rules on the nationality of persons 
and ships,182 would be non-derogable, and in the Kadi case, the CJEU 
found that “respect for human rights” had jus cogens character.183 
Some cases of denial of nationality might rise to the level of jus 
cogens when practiced in the context of other jus cogens obligations. It 
goes without saying that the refusal or withdrawal of nationality would 
be a jus cogens violation when that measure was taken on a prohibited 
ground of discrimination, such as racial, ethnic, religious, etc. Denial 
of nationality due to racial, ethnic, religion, etc.184 Some authorities 
have opined that the denial of nationality that leads to detention might 
amount to mistreatment equivalent to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment.185 However, those practices might not rise to the level of jus 
cogens because only torture is the one most clearly established as a jus 
 
176. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 302 (1968). 
177. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, 
Ukraine, & Uruguay). 
178. Fitzmaurice, supra note 164; U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, 311 (1968) (Italy: 
Maresca). 
179. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/11, at 297, 302, 322, 303 (1968) (Lebanon, Poland, 
Ukraine, & Uruguay). 
180. See generally Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Ad. Op., 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18 (Sep. 17, 2003). 
181. See Case 42/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, para. 22, 1974 E.C.R. I-1338. 
182. See Chen v. Sec’y of St. for the Home Dept., supra note 8, para. 37; Rottmann v. 
Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 39, 53, 58. 
183. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 282, 303-4. 
184. See Gay McDougall (Independent Expert on Minority Issues), Human Rights 
Council, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/23 (Feb. 28, 
2008) (stating that prohibition of discrimination is a non-derogation norm). See also Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Draft Articles on Nationality of Natural Persons in Relation to the Succession of 
States, art. 15, II Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 37 (1999). 
185. See Arbitrary Deprivation Report 2015, supra note 111 (“41. . . . stateless children in 
context of migration or forced displacement are more vulnerable to arbitrary and lengthy 
immigration detention because their lack of a nationality makes it impossible to remove them 
from the country within a reasonable period of time. Such detention may be considered in 
violation of both the freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the freedom from 
arbitrary deprivation of liberty”). 
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cogens norm. Although the Human Rights Council concluded that 
denial of nationality qualified as cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment, it did not go so far as to argue that nationality denial is itself 
torture.186 However, it is at least conceivable that nationality 
deprivation, possibly in connection with other aggravating factors, 
might indeed rise to the level of torture, although examples of such 
situations are perhaps more difficult to articulate. Lastly, denial of 
nationality without any means of judicial or administrative review 
would also be problematic and certainly a violation of fundamental 
rights,187 though it might be a stretch to view that as a jus cogens 
violation. 
Setting aside unlawful nationality denial that implicates other jus 
cogens norms, this paragraph will consider whether unlawful 
nationality denial alone would itself amount to a jus cogens violation. 
The right to a nationality certainly appears to be so critical that it could 
fall within the lists given above and has been described as non-
derogable.188 It is unclear whether the UNHCR understands unlawful 
nationality denial to be a jus cogens norm, though that possibility is not 
excluded.189 The right to nationality is a fundamental right190 which is 
interlinked with and central to the enjoyment of many other human 
 
186. See supra note 185. 
187. See Policy Dep’t for Citizens’ Rights & Constitutional Affairs, Eur. Parliament’s 
Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, E.U. and Member States’ Policies and 
Laws on Persons Suspected of Terrorism-related Crimes, E.U. Doc. PE 596.832 (Dec. 18, 2017). 
188. See Expelled Dominicans & Haitians v. Dom. Rep., Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) para. 253 (Aug. 28, 2014); Girls 
Yean & Bosico v. Dom. Rep., Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), paras. 136-38 (Sep. 8, 2005). 
189. See, e.g., Expert Mtg., The Concept of Stateless Persons Under International Law: 
Summary, para. 18 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf [https://perma.cc/P62V-
RRG4 ] (comparing nonrecognition of state created through violation of jus cogens norms 
against use of force to recognition of statelessness created contrary to law). 
190. H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 1 (“Reaffirm[ing] the right to a nationality of 
every human person is a fundamental human right enshrined in, inter alia, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”); Cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257-68 (1967) (deciding 
that Congress did not have the power to revoke nationality on constitutional grounds). 
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rights.191 It has been called the “right to have rights.”192 It does, after 
all, repetitively appear in virtually every major human rights treaty,193 
suggesting it is a human rights norm of very special significance. There 
is a very consistent pattern of resolutions by the Human Rights Council 
that the human right to nationality is a fundamental human right and 
that the arbitrary deprivation of it is unlawful.194 The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights held that the right to a nationality provides a 
foundation link to a state for protection of human rights.195 The Human 
Rights Committee concluded similarly that the arbitrary revocation of 
nationality can impact an individual’s ability to enjoy all of his or her 
human rights,196 and that the revocation of nationality simply as a 
pretext to expel a person was a denial of the person’s fundamental 
 
191. H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, at 2 (Stressing “that all human rights are universal, 
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated and that the international community must treat 
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing and with the same 
emphasis”). 
192. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 292-300 (1994). 
See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that denationalization is “the total 
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society”). 
193. See ICCPR, supra note 75, art. 24(3); H.R.C. Dec. 2/111, supra note 111; H.R.C. 
Res. 13/2, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 79; 
H.R.C. Res. 1998/48, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 1999/28, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 
2005/45, supra note 111; CERD, supra note 75, art. 5(d)(iii); Discrimination Recommendation 
2002, supra note116, paras. 13-14; CEDAW, supra note 75, art. 9; CEDAW Gen. Recomm. No. 
21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, 1994, art. 9; CPMW, supra note 75, art. 29; 
CRPD, supra note 84, art. 18(1); American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose, 
Costa Rica”) (B-32), Nov, 22, 1969, art. 3, OAS TS No. 36, 144 UNTS 123, reprinted at BASIC 
DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OAS Doc. 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1992) (AmCHR); U.N. Secretary-General, Human Rights 
and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/28 (Dec. 19, 2012). See also 
G.A. Res. 217A(III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), art. 6 (Dec. 10, 1948); 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX (May 2, 1948), art. 
XVII, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1. 
194. See H.R.C. Res. 7/10, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res. 10/13, supra note 79; H.R.C. Res. 
13/2, supra note 111; H.R.C. Res. 20/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/4 (July 16, 2012); H.R.C. 
Res. 20/5, supra note 79); H.R.C. Res. 26/14 (26 June 2014); H.R.C. Res 32/5, supra note 110. 
195. Proposed Amends. to the Naturalization Provision of the Constitution of Costa Rica, 
Advisory Opinion, OC-4/84, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 32-35 (Jan. 19, 1984) (“the right 
to a nationality established therein provides the individual with a minimal measure of legal 
protection in international relations through the link his nationality establishes between him and 
the state in question . . . .”). 
196. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 7 (noting “that the full enjoyment of all 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of an individual might be impeded as a result of the 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality, and that such individuals are placed in a situation of 
increased vulnerability to human rights violations”). 
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human rights. 197 Furthermore, the link of nationality with a state has 
been identified as critical for the individual’s sense of identity,198 
explaining the reason why children have a specially protected right to 
a nationality,199 and in situations of state succession. All of the 
foregoing suggests that a good case can be argued that the right to a 
nationality is itself a jus cogens norm.  
In addition to the discussion above, it is arguable that the 
European Union would be without powers to recognize an unlawful 
refusal of nationality. The Kadi decision of the CJEU attempted to 
determine the full scope of the obligations imposed by a UN Security 
Council Resolution which was in turn implemented in the EU Member 
State through an act of the Union.200 The Court took the unusual 
approach of considering that a treaty cannot be adopted that violates 
jus cogens so that an international organization, founded by a treaty, 
also cannot be understood to have powers to adopt acts that violate jus 
cogens.201 On this basis, the Security Council cannot prescribe actions 
that entail violations of jus cogens.202 Essentially, the CJEU used jus 
cogens norms as a tool for interpreting the powers of an international 
organization. A similar approach might be taken with regard to EU 
citizenship and the unlawful denial of Member State nationality. As the 
TFEU is interpreted using the standard law of treaties,203 we might 
interpret the Union as not having the power to refuse to recognize EU 
citizenship in such a case. 
 
197. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 3 (“that the statelessness of a person 
resulting from the arbitrary deprivation of his or her nationality cannot be invoked by States as 
a justification for the denial of other human rights”). 
198. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 11 (reiterating, “that the right to identity 
is intimately linked to the right of nationality”). 
199. See H.R.C. Res. 32/5, supra note 110, para. 9 (reaffirming, “that every child has the 
right to acquire a nationality, and recognizes the special needs of children for protection against 
arbitrary deprivation of nationality”). 
200. See Kadi Case, supra note 142. 
201. See id; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 138, art. 53, 64. 
202. See Kadi Case, supra note 142, paras. 53, 64.  
203. See Case C-70/09, Hengartner & Gassner v. Landesregierung Vorarlberg, Judgment, 
2010 E.C.R. I-7233, I-7244, para. 36 (2010); Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, 
1998 E.C.R. II-02739; Case C-162/96, Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, supra note 
142. 
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2. Ex injuria jus non oritur 
Returning to the duty of nonrecognition, it is important to note 
that this duty is not only imposed for jus cogens violations. In fact, it is 
the general principle of ex injuria jus non oritur, applicable to any 
unlawful act. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ found that South 
Africa was in violation of an obligation imposed by the UN Security 
Council,204 not necessarily a jus cogens norm. Certainly the underlying 
violation was most likely a jus cogens norm, but the ICJ did not need 
to reach that finding in order to invoke ex injuria jus non oritur for 
violating a binding Security Council resolution.205 In addition to the 
Namibia situation, the UN Security Council has demanded 
nonrecognition for a number of other cases.206 
But the obligation of nonrecognition is not limited to only UN 
Security Council resolutions; it accrues to any violation of international 
law.207 For example, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, the 
 
204. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152 (“The member States of the United Nations 
are, for the reasons given in paragraph 115 above [binding nature of U.N.S.C resolutions], under 
obligation to recognize the illegality and invalidity of South Africa’s continued presence in 
Namibia. They are also under obligation to refrain from lending any support or any form of 
assistance to South Africa with reference to its occupation of Namibia, subject to paragraph 125 
below”). 
205. See id. paras. 117-18 (June 21). 
206. See Kosovo Declaration, supra note 160, para. 14 (separate opinion by Koroma, J.) 
As subsidiary bodies of the Security Council, they [the international territorial 
administration in Kosovo] possess limited authority derived from and circumscribed 
by [UN Security Council] resolution 1244 (1999). No power is vested in any of those 
bodies to determine the final status of Kosovo, nor do any of them have the power to 
create other bodies which would have such a power. Accordingly, when the Assembly 
of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo purported to declare 
independence on 17 February 2008, they attempted to carry out an act which exceeded 
their competence. As such, the declaration is a nullity, an unlawful act that violates 
express provisions of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). It is ex injuria non 
oritur jus (internal citations omitted). 
U.N.S.C. Res. 216 (1965); U.N.S.C. Res. 217 (1965); U.N.S.C. Res. 277 (1970); U.N.S.C. Res. 
242 (1967); U.N.S.C. Res. 288 (1970); U.N.S.C. Res. 476 (1980); U.N.S.C. Res. 478 (1980); 
U.N.S.C. Res. 491 (1981); U.N.S.C. Res. 836 (1993); U.N.G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX); Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 130, art. 41(8). 
207. See Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions (Gr. v. UK), Judgment, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. 
A) No. 5, at 50 (Mar. 26); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germ. v. Pol.) (Claim for 
Indemnity) (Juris.), Judgment, 1927, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (July 26); L. Status of E. 
Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 95 (Apr. 5) (Anzilotti, 
J., dissenting) (“[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at law. . . .”); Divers. of 
Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), Judgment, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B, no 70); Divers. of 
Water from the Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.) 1937 PCIJ, Ser. P.C.I.J. (ser. C, No 81), para. 240; U.S. 
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ICJ also found that ex injuria jus non oritur applied generally and, in 
that case, applied to the rather mundane violation of a treaty for the 
construction of infrastructure.208 Also, in the Namibia opinion held that 
the obligation of nonrecognition applies to all states in the world, not 
only to UN Member States.209 Since non-members of an organization 
cannot be legally responsible for violating Security Council 
resolutions, it cannot be the normative force of the resolution that 
required states to refuse to recognize the legal effects of Namibia’s 
actions. Lastly, we find the same conclusion implied in the views of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties. In preparing his report, 
Lauterpacht, quoting McNair, concluded that a treaty would be 
rendered void when it had as its object any violation of customary 
international law, not only jus cogens norms or Security Council 
resolutions.210 For these reasons, we need not necessarily find that the 
right to a nationality constitutes a jus cogens norm in order to apply the 
principle of ex injuria jus non oritur. 
Following Namibia, the precise parameters of the nonrecognition 
obligation are wide-ranging. Primarily, other states must regard the 
official acts of the state pertaining to the unlawful conduct as 
“invalid,”211 and “void” on the international plane.212 Specifically, the 
 
Dipl. & Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 51, 58 (May 24) (Morozov 
& Tarazi, JJ., dissenting, at 53–55, 62–63); Military & Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, para. 270; (June 27) (Schwebel, J., 
dissenting); Accord. with Kosovo Declaration, supra note 160, para. 132-37 (separate opinion 
by Cançado Trindade, J.) (“According to a well-established general principle of international 
law, a wrongful act cannot become a source of advantages, benefits or rights for the wrongdoer 
: ex injuria jus non oritur” although applying the principle only to cases of “grave breaches” or 
“atrocities perpetrated against the population”) (internal citations omitted). See generally 
William Thomas Worster, The Effect of Leaked Information on International Legal Norms, 28 
AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 443 (2013). 
208. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. / Slovak.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, 76, 
para. 133 (Sep. 25). 
The Court, however, cannot disregard the fact . . . Nor can it overlook that factual situation 
. . . This does not mean that facts - in this case facts which flow from wrongful conduct - 
determine the law. The principle ex injuria jus non oritur is sustained by the Court’s finding that 
the legal relationship created by the 1977 Treaty is preserved and cannot in this case be treated 
as voided by unlawful conduct. 
209. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 126. 
210. See II YB Int’l L. Comm’n 154 (1953) (Lauterpacht citing McNair) (“It is believed 
that a treaty between two States the execution of which contemplates the infliction upon a third 
State of what customary international law regards as a wrong is illegal and invalid ab initio.” 
211. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125. 
212. See U.N.S.C. Res. 662, para. 1 (Aug. 9, 1990) (“[N]ull and void”). 
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other states may not enter into treaties pertaining to the unlawful act,213 
cannot conduct economic relations pertaining to the unlawful act,214 
and cannot send diplomatic or consular missions in support of the 
unlawful act.215 
However, the risk is that the refusal to recognize official acts 
might harm individuals. In the Namibia advisory opinion, the ICJ 
concluded that there was a different consideration for “general 
conventions such as those of a humanitarian character, the non-
performance of which may adversely affect the people of [the 
state].”216 Where the nonrecognition of official acts would operate to 
the detriment of the population, those acts may be recognized 
exceptionally.217 This conclusion leads to the dissonance that an 
official act of state may be lawful and valid for some purposes, but not 
lawful or valid for other purposes. However, this conclusion makes 
sense, because otherwise states could not apply, for example, 
international humanitarian law to situations arising from unlawful 
aggression, because the aggression was unlawful and “void.”218 We 
 
213. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 122. Additionally, other states must 
suspend operation of existing treaties pertaining to the unlawful conduct. Id. 
214. See id. para. 124. 
215. See id. para. 123. 
216. See id. para. 122. See also Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 152, paras. 4, 5; Hopkins v. 
Mex., 4 U.N. REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 41 (1926); R. (on the application of Kibris Turk Hava 
Yollari) v Secretary of State for Transport, Case No: CO/3512/2007  [2009] E.W.H.C. 1918 
(Admin); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 253 (2009) (Eng.); Emin v Yeldag [2002] 1 F.L.R. 956 
(UK); B v. B (Divorce: N. Cyprus) [2000] 2 F.L.R. 707, [2001] 3 F.C.R. 331 (UK); Somalia v. 
Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA (The Mary) [1993] QB 54 (UK); Reel v. Holder [1981] 
1 W.L.R. 1226; [1981] 3 All E.R. 321; (1981) 125 S.J. 585 (UK); Hesperides Hotels Ltd v. 
Aegean Turk. Holidays Ltd [1978] 1 QB 205 (UK); In re Al-Fin Corp.’s Patent, [1970] Ch 160, 
177-81 (UK); Luigi Monta of Genoa v Cechofracht Co [1956] 2 QB 552; [1956] 3 WLR 480 
(QB Div., Jun. 14, 1956) (Sellers, J.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 205(3) 
(1987). 
217.  See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125 (“should not result in depriving the 
people of [the state] of any advantages derived from international co-operation . . . [the] 
invalidity [of official acts] cannot be extended to those acts, such as, for instance, the registration 
of births, deaths and marriages, the effects of which can be ignored only to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the Territory”). 
218. See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 807-8 (1997); Enzo Canizzaro, 
Contextualizing Proportionality: Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Lebanese War, 88 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 791 (2006); Christopher Greenwood, The Relationship Between Jus ad Bellum 
and Jus in Bello, 9 REV. INT’L STUDIES 227 (1983). 
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would not want the legal nullification of unlawful acts to excuse an 
actor from responsibility for other consequential obligations.219 
For the topic of this Article on unlawful denial of Member State 
nationality and EU citizenship, the obligation of nonrecognition could 
operate to render certain individuals as enjoying Member State 
nationality constructively and EU citizenship accordingly. If indeed, 
the refusal of nationality is unlawful as argued above, then the denial 
of that nationality must be “invalid.”220 If the denial is invalid, then the 
Member State must be deemed to have granted nationality de jure, even 
if it has not done so de facto.221 In turn, if the Member State is deemed 
to have granted nationality de jure, then EU law commands that the 
individual also acquires EU citizenship. 
There is some precedent for recognizing a person as having a 
nationality when the person, in fact, does not.222 For example, states 
have recognized the “nationality” of individuals from Taiwan, 
Northern Cyprus, Palestine, and colonial mandates for certain 
 
219. Some questionable, quasi-states, while not recognized as states, are still held to 
human rights and international humanitarian law. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 
Judgment, paras. 115-46 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Appls. Ch., July 15, 1999); 
Gould et al. v. PLO & Palestinian Auth., Case No. 04-CIV.-00397 (GBD) (SDNY, Feb. 25, 
2015); ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ACTORS 291-444 
(2006); see generally JEAN S. PICTET, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 
COMMENTARY, I GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE 
WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD (1952); PHILIP ALSTON, The “Not-a-
Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, 
in., NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005); Rep. China [on 
Taiwan Island], Ofc Pres., President Ma Attends Press Conference Unveiling English Version 
of Taiwan’s First National Human Rights Report under the ICCPR and ICESCR (Dec. 18, 2012) 
available at 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&itemid=28855&rmid=2355 
[https://perma.cc/LMJ7-M4D5] ; Rep. China [on Taiwan Island], Ofc Pres., President Ma Holds 
Press Conference on the Release of Taiwan’s First Human Rights Report (Apr. 20, 2012) 
available at 
http://english.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=491&rmid=2355&itemid=27092 
[https://perma.cc/U6YV-PCNB]. 
220. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 125. 
221. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Expert Mtg. The Concept of Stateless 
Persons under International Law, para. 20 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GR63-53T3] (“[Statelessness] refers to a factual situation, not to the manner 
in which a person became stateless”). 
222. See generally William Thomas Worster, Relative International Legal Personality of 
Non-State Actors, 42 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 207 (2016). 
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purposes.223 Also, the Human Rights Committee, in the context of the 
right to return to one’s own country, has held that individuals 
unlawfully denied their nationality still retain the right to return to their 
“own country,” despite no longer actually holding their state’s 
nationality.224 
This conclusion on the constructive acquisition of EU citizenship 
is strengthened by the ICJ’s statements in Namibia that treaties must be 
applied or suspended to the degree to which they pertain to the unlawful 
conduct.225 This author has already argued that the TFEU can be read 
to permit recognition of EU citizenship despite the unlawful denial of 
Member State nationality, simply by another Member State making a 
good faith determination that a person holds EU citizenship, even 
though in disagreement with another Member State. For the obligation 
of ex injuria jus non oritur under discussion in this section, other states 
cannot enter into economic and other relations with the state pertaining 
 
223. See U.N. Compensation Commission Dec., U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, art. 5.2 
(June 26, 1992) (permitting third parties to submit claims on behalf of individuals who cannot 
get their claims submitted by a government); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
MANUAL AND HANDBOOK, 403.4-4(D), 403.4-7(C) (providing passport instructions to agency 
officials in accordance with United States’ recognition policy and general consistency with 
current sovereignty regarding Republic of China on Taiwan Island and the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus) [hereinafter FAM]; Caglar v. Billingham (Insp. of Taxes) [1996] STC 150 
(SCD) at 151 (Eng.); 584 Hansard HL col. WA205 (Jan. 15, 1998); 304 Hansard HC col. WA277 
(Jan. 15, 1998); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 
(2006) (regarding “A” Mandated Territories); Linda A. Taylor, The United Nations 
Compensation Commission, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 197, 202 (Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens eds., 
2009); see also Paul Koring, Palestine exists for a select few Canadians, THE GLOBE & MAIL 
(Sep. 20, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/palestine-exists-for-a-select-
few-canadians/article594913 [https://perma.cc/JZB7-6MCM] (explaining that Palestine exists 
as a valid “Country of Birth” for Canadians despite their government not recognizing Palestine 
as a state). But see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL AND HANDBOOK, 403.4-
4(A)(h) (prohibiting “Palestine” as a valid country of birth after 1948 and requiring instead 
“West Bank,” “Gaza Strip,” or “Israel”). 
224. Gen. Comm. on the Freedom of Movement, Human Rights Comm. on its Sixty-
Seventh Session held on Oct. 18, 1999, para. 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 1, 
1999): 
Thus, the persons entitled to exercise this right . . . embraces, at the very least, an 
individual who, because of his or her special ties to or claims in relation to a given 
country, cannot be considered to be a mere alien. This would be the case, for example, 
of nationals of a country who have there been stripped of their nationality in violation 
of international law . . . . 
225. See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 122 (June 21). Additionally, states must 
suspend operation of existing treaties pertaining to the unlawful conduct. Id. 
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to the unlawful conduct.226 This obligation means that the economic 
and other rights in the TFEU must be applied as if the unlawful act has 
not occurred. To refuse to honor the individual’s constructive EU 
citizenship would be to enter into an economic relationship that honors 
the refusal of EU citizenship. Furthermore, states cannot send 
diplomatic and consular missions that support or give implied validity 
to the unlawful acts. This obligation suggests that the officers of the 
state must discharge their functions in a manner not recognizing the 
unlawful act. Immigration officers, consuls giving protection, etc. must 
treat the person whose nationality is unlawfully denied as having 
constructive EU citizenship or they will be giving effect to the unlawful 
state action.227 
In addition to all of the considerations above, the ICJ’s Namibia 
exception for issues of humanitarian nature also commands that we 
honor constructive EU citizenship.228 Certainly, giving legal effect to a 
state’s unlawful denial of nationality would adversely affect 
individuals. Where the nonrecognition of official acts would operate to 
the detriment of the population, then they may be recognized.229 
Because this is an exception for the benefit of people, constructive 
nationality and EU citizenship should be recognized where they work 
to the person’s advantage (e.g., freedom of movement in the European 
Union) and not recognized where they work against the person (e.g., 
additional protections accruing to stateless persons under the 
Statelessness Convention). Even if unlawful deprivation of nationality 
is unlawful, states can still recognize the case as the creation of 
statelessness,230 while treating the individual as if he or she had a 
 
226. See id., para. 124 
227. See id., para. 123 
228. See id., para. 122 
229. See id., para. 125 
230. See U.N.H.C.R., Expert Meeting, The Concept of Stateless Persons under 
International Law, para. 18 (May 28, 2010), www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L43D-68XM]. 
[W]here a deprivation of nationality may be contrary to rules of international law, this 
illegality is not relevant in determining whether the person is [stateless] . . . The 
alternative approach would lead to outcomes contrary to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms [on statelessness] . . . This does not, however, prejudice any obligation that 
States may have not to recognize such situations as legal where the illegality relates 
to a violation of jus cogens norms. 
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nationality for other purposes,231 because a statelessness determination 
examines the factual situation, not the method of loss of nationality. 232 
One final thought on this matter is that the underlying reasoning 
of Nottebohm might permit a state to recognize EU citizenship even 
without the need to resort to ex injuria jus non oritur. In Nottebohm, 
the ICJ held that states are not required to recognize the nationality of 
other states when the grant of nationality is not in compliance with 
international law, which requires a “genuine link.”233 Actually, the 
Court held that all public acts of a state, including the grant of 
nationality among others, cannot demand unquestioning recognition, 
when contrary to international law.234 If an EU Member State 
determined that such an unlawful act by a sister Member State occurred 
and decided to treat the individual as if he had EU citizenship, then this 
act should be permissible. 
The possibility to refuse to recognize other Member State acts 
does not violate existing EU law. The situation is fundamentally 
different from Rottmann and Micheletti where the duty of sincere 
cooperation within the European Union requires states to give effect 
other state’s acts. Rottmann was concerned with the revocation of 
Member State nationality and the impact on EU citizenship.235 
Micheletti was focused on the refusal to recognize another Member 
State’s nationality with serious negative implications for EU 
citizenship.236 This proposal in this article is quite different; it concerns 
the refusal to recognize a Member State’s denial of nationality, in favor 
of EU citizenship for the individual. This situation does not raise the 
same implications for EU citizenship and sincere cooperation that the 
denials of EU citizenship in Rottmann and Micheletti did, because it 
protects EU citizenship from wrongful denial. Thus, this proposal is in 
alignment with Rottmann and Micheletti. 
Finally, the obligation to refuse to recognize an unlawful denial 
of nationality applies to all states. In the Namibia opinion, the ICJ 
concluded that the obligation of nonrecognition applies to all states in 
the world, not only to UN Member States.237 While this might be based 
 
231. See FAM, supra note 223, at 41.104, 41.113; Crawford, supra note 221, at 31. See 
also Caglar v. Billingham, supra note 223, at 151. 
232.  U.N.H.C.R., supra note 218, at 4 para. 20  
233. See Nottebohm Case, supra note 23. 
234. See id. 
235. Rottmann v. Bayern, supra note 8, paras. 42-5, 55-56. 
236. Id. 
237.  See Namibia Opinion, supra note 152, para. 126. 
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on the special nature of the United Nations, the Court does not 
articulate it as such. For this reason, the obligation to recognize 
constructive EU citizenship applies equally to states that are not 
members of the European Union as it does to EU Member States. While 
other EU Member State may have more obvious obligations such as 
respecting free movement and providing for participation in EU 
parliamentary elections, non-EU states will need to give certain 
benefits to the individuals as part of their EU citizenship. For example, 
to the degree to which other states have accepted the right of any EU 
Member State’s mission to exercise diplomatic assistance and to 
protect any EU citizen, such practice should be respected for 
constructive EU citizens. There may also be other benefits for travel 
visas, scholarship funding, and so on, available in third states to EU 
citizens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has concluded that the unlawful revocation or refusal 
of Member State nationality cannot have a legal effect within the EU 
legal order and that an individual should have his or her EU citizenship 
recognized by other states, despite the denial of Member State 
nationality. An individual acquires EU citizenship when he or she holds 
Member State nationality. While the acquisition of EU citizenship is 
dependent on Member State nationality, EU citizenship is largely 
independent of Member State nationality for other purposes. This dual 
nature is in keeping with EU citizenship being a person’s fundamental 
legal status within the Union, placing that person into a direct legal 
bond with the Union. 
Because the acquisition of EU citizenship is dependent upon the 
acquisition of Member State nationality, the nationality laws of the 
Member State are critical. The Member States retain considerable 
discretion in determining which persons are eligible for acquisition and 
retention of nationality. But this discretion is not unlimited. For 
example, Member States are not free to impose discriminatory rules for 
the acquisition of their nationality. Such a rule would, in effect, mean 
that the Union had adopted discriminatory rules for the acquisition of 
EU citizenship, through the instrumentality of the Member State. 
Clearly, international and European human rights law would prohibit 
such a practice. Discrimination is only one limitation and other 
limitations include protections from statelessness and the arbitrary 
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revocation of nationality, as well as the protection of other human 
rights, such as the right to an identity. 
This Article has examined the impact on EU citizenship when a 
Member State persists in imposing unlawful nationality laws. EU law 
requires states to act with sincere cooperation in implementing their EU 
obligations, including adopting nationality laws. While Member States 
may be prohibited under law from adopting certain nationality 
measures, those laws may not necessarily have domestic effect. In such 
cases, other Member States, and the Union itself, should not be required 
to recognize the unlawful act. The ability to refuse recognition of 
unlawful acts has a long pedigree in international law and states have 
exercised this right for any violation of international law, not only jus 
cogens obligations. There is a possibility for interpreting the TFEU to 
grant EU citizenship despite the unlawful denial of Member State 
nationality, and the duty of sincere cooperation does not otherwise 
require Member States to recognize a denial of nationality. Therefore, 
the other Member States and the Union itself will be under a duty to 
refuse legal effect to the unlawful act, a duty that EU law will not 
excuse. The consequence will be that the other Member States and the 
Union will recognize an individual as having de jure EU citizenship 
notwithstanding the lack of de facto Member State nationality. 
There are several ways in which this practice might arise. One 
possibility is that, following the denial of Member State nationality, the 
individual could request a referral to the CJEU. Similarly, if the 
individual was physically in a different EU Member State and applied 
for rights deriving from his or her claim to EU citizenship, then he or 
she could appeal the denial, and, again, request a referral to the CJEU 
if necessary. Of course, either one of these processes could be 
abbreviated if the Member State resolved the question of EU 
citizenship at a lower appellate level. Yet another possible scenario is 
for a claimant to EU citizenship to apply directly to the Union for some 
exercise of EU citizenship rights, such as EU civil servant employment, 
and request the Union to recognize his or her EU citizenship despite 
the Member State refusing nationality. Obviously, this practice may 
cause some logistical difficulties, such as establishing EU citizenship 
without possessing a Member State passport, but these are merely 
evidentiary complications. This author has previously argued that the 
Union should take the step of documenting EU citizenship separately 
from Member State nationality, in keeping with its distinct fundamental 
status, and this article argues in favor of that practice again. 
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In summary, while EU Member States serve as gatekeepers to EU 
citizenship by exercising their nationality laws, they may not impose 
nationality laws that are unlawful. Such unlawful acts cannot have 
lawful consequences. Not only does the Member State violate 
European and international law in doing so, but the recognition of its 
unlawful act would implicate the other Member States and the Union. 
Those other actors are bound by international law to refuse to recognize 
unlawful acts as having lawful consequences, so they would violate 
international law to act otherwise. In addition, in so far as the 
recognition of the unlawful nationality refusal must be given effect 
within the other Member States and Union legal order, those other 
actors would be violating other primary rules of international law. All 
of these arguments force us to conclude that, should an EU Member 
State unlawfully deny any person its nationality, and thus EU 
citizenship, the other EU Member States and the Union must 
nonetheless give effect to EU citizenship. 
